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Texts  for  Students  of  International  Relations. 
No.    2. 

SULL  mmmmmma 

Grand  Design  of   Henry  IV. 

FROM      THE 

Memoirs  of  Maximilian  de  Bethune 
due  de  Sully  (1559=1641). 




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Texts  for  Students  of  International  Relations. 

Edited   by    DAVID    OGG,    M.A. 

1.  ERASMUS  :— Institiitio  principis  christiani. 

Translated,  with  an  Introduction  by  PERCY  ELLWOOD  CORBETT,  M.C., 
Fellow  of  All  Souls  College,  Oxford. 

2.  SULLY: — Grand  Design  of  Henry  IV. 

Edited,  with  an  Introduction  by  DAVID  OGG,  M.A.,  Fellow  and  Tutor 
of  New  College,  Oxford. 

3.  GROTIUS  :— De  jure  belli  et  pacis.     Selections. 

Translated,  with  an  Introduction  by  W.  S.  M.  KNIGHT,  of  New  College, 
Oxford,  and  of  the  Inner  Temple,  Barrister-at-Law. 

4.  The   English  Quakers  and   Perpetual  Peace. 

Edited  with  Introduction  by  DAVID  OGG,  M.A.,  Fellow  and  Tutor  ol 
Xe\v  College,  Oxford. 

5.  SAINT-PIERRE:— Projet  de   Paix   perpetuelle.      Abrege   du 

Projet  de  Paix  perpetuelle.      Selections. 

Translated,  with  an  Introduction  by  H.  HALE  BELLOT,  M.A.  Formerly 
Scholar  of  Lincoln  College,  Oxford. 

6.  BENTHAM  : — Plan  for  an   Universal  and  Perpetual    Peace. 

With  an  Introduction  by  GEORGE  GRENVILLE  PHILLIMORE,  M.A.,  B.C.L. 
Formerly  Scholar  of  Christ  Church,  Oxford,  and  of  the  Middle  Temple. 

7.  KANT  :— Selections. 

Translated,  with  an  Introduction  by 

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Texts  for  Students  of  International  Relations. 

No.    2. 

S  U  L  L  Y/'-Si  ; 

Grand  Design  of   Henry  IV. 

FKOM      THE 

Memoirs  of  Maximilien  de  Bethune 
due  de  Sully  (1559=1641). 




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Schemes  for  securing  perpetual  peace  generally  have  for  their 
authors  either  philosophers  (such  as  Bentham  and  Kant)  or 
accomplished  scholars  (like  Pope  Leo  X.)  or  idealist  statesmen 
(e.g.,  President  Wilson),  but  rarely  financiers.  The  realm  of 
finance  is  an  uncongenial  one  for  the  altruist  and  the  day-dreamer ; 
the  uncompromising,  the  matter-of-fact,  and,  perhaps,  the  un- 
exuberant  are  likely  to  be  its  most  flourishing  types.  There  is, 
however,  one  striking  exception  to  this  generalisation.  Maximilian 
of  Bethune,  Duke  of  Sully  (1559 — 1641),  acquired  considerable 
reputation  as  Henry  IV.  's  Superintendent  of  Finance  after  he  had 
laid  the  foundations  of  a  very  large  private  fortune  from  booty 
appropriated  in  the  troublous  times  preceding  the  accession  of  his 
royal  master.  His  task  as  finance  minister  was  a  herculean  one, 
since  not  only  had  he  to  find  new  sources  of  revenue,  increase  the 
prosperity  of  France  by  devising  new  roads  and  canals,  and 
redeem  many  Crown  lands  and  prerogatives  from  pawn,  but  he 
had  also  to  reorganise  the  whole  system  of  tax-collecting  and, 
perhaps  most  difficult  of  all,  to  refuse  all  grants  of  money  to  the 
monarch  that  were  likely  to  be  spent  in  private  pleasure.  That 
imagination  was  not  Sully 's  strongest  characteristic  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  he  was  the  first  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  who 
could  boast  that  his  budgets  were  honest.  Avarice,  austerity,  and 
shrewdness  were  the  qualities  attributed  to  him  by  contem- 
poraries; and  in  his  Memoirs  he  shows  that  he  was  quite 
aware  of  his  reputation.  It  is  therefore  a  remarkable  fact  that 
he  should  himself  have  been  the  author  of  one  of  the  most 
imaginative  and  comprehensive  schemes  for  securing  what  so 


many  have  regarded  as  a  mere  chimera;  and  it  is  perhaps 
evidence  of  his  consciousness  of  this  seeming  inconsistency  that 
he  took  great  pains  to  father  the  scheme  on  someone  else. 

Before  examining  the  Grand  Design  in  detail,  it  is  necessary  to 
say  something  of  the  history  of  the  book,  a  part  of  which  is  here 

.  t 

After  the*  murder*  "of"  Henry  IV.,  Sully  went  into  retirement; 
find  Itidvfeii"-  "Allying  Ane  .minority  of  Louis  XIII.  there  were 
a  few  occasions  "wrien  he  might  have  been  invited  to  return 
to  public  life,  he  was  nevertheless  condemned  to  political 
inactivity  for  over  thirty  years.  Like  St.  Simon  after  him,  he 
employed  a  considerable  part  of  his  enforced  leisure  in  compiling 
his  Memoirs,  and,  like  St.  Simon  also,  he  adopted  a  consistent 
attitude  of  "  laudator  temporis  acti."  He  had  always  prided 
himself  on  his  literary  skill.  During  the  lifetime  of  Henry  he  had 
completed  a  biography  of  that  monarch,  and  in  retirement  he 
wrote  several  treatises  on  miscellaneous  subjects.  With  the  aid 
of  one  of  his  secretaries,  he  began,  about  1611,  to  draw  up  his 
Memoires,  or  Oeconomies  Royales  d'Estat,  and  these  were 
at  first  compiled  in  the  second  person,  the  secretary  calling  to 
mind  the  many  achievements  of  Sully  's  administration.  In  this, 
the  original  form,  they  were  completed  by  about  1617,  and  the 
manuscripts  were  acquired  by  the  Bibliotheque  Nationale  in  1843. 
These  manuscripts  contain  six  or  seven  references  to  what  has 
been  called  the  Grand  Design,  and  a  brief  enumeration  of  these 
will  reveal  the  scheme  in  embryo  (a). 

The  first  reference  is  under  the  year  1596,  just  after  the  sub- 
mission of  D'Epernon  and  when  Henry's  victory  over  his  enemies 
of  the  League  was  practically  complete.  According  to  Sully,  Henry 
took  him  aside  and  confessed  that  he  hoped  God  would  enable  him 
to  retake  Navarre,  that  he  would  be  granted  a  victory  against  the 
King  of  Spain,  that  he  might,  in  some  way,  surpass  the  deeds  of 
Don  John  of  Austria,  the  victor  of  Lepanto,  and  that  he  might  be 
relieved  of  his  wife.  He  referred  also  to  two  great  projects  which 
he  wished  to  put  into  execution  before  his  death,  but  these  are 
not  specified  by  his  biographer.  The  next  reference  in  the  MSS. 
is  in  connection  with  Sully  's  embassy  to  England  in  1603,  when 

(a)  For  a  complete  examination  of  these  MSS.,  see  the  articles  by  Pfister  in 
Revue  Historique,  1894,  Vols.  LIV.,  L»V.,  and  LVI. 


he  was  sent  to  congratulate  James  on  his  accession.  On  this 
occasion  Henry  is  credited  with  telling  his  ambassador  that  he 
wished  to  ally  with  England,  Venice,  the  Low  Countries,  the 
Protestant  princes  and  towns  of  Germany  against  Spain,  and  that 
for  this  purpose  he  wished  to  effect  a  marriage  alliance  with 
England.  Together  with  these  public  instructions,  Sully,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  account,  was  given  certain  secret  commissions, 
and,  in  particular,  was  to  confer  with  the  English  king  on  the 
following  proposals  :  — 

1.  France,  England,  and  Holland  to  combine  their  naval  forces 
and  seize  the  Spanish  Indies  or  some  of  the  islands  on  the  routes 
of  the  Spanish  treasure  fleets. 

2.  The    Hapsburgs,    by    the    pressure    of    a    great    European 
coalition,  to  be  deprived  of  the  Empire  and  reduced  to  Spain. 

3.  The  rivers  Meuse,  Moselle,  and  Ehine  to  be  seized  so  as  to 
control  the  Low  Countries. 

With  regard  to  the  proposed  coalition  against  the  Hapsburgs, 
Sully  notes  that  all  the  participants  were  to  benefit  territorially 
except  France  and  England. 

The  third  reference  is  in  1604,  when  Sully  records  that  he 
refused  Henry  a  grant  of  public  money  for  his  pleasures  on  the 
ground  that  every  penny  would  be  required  for  the  Grand  Design. 
In  1609  there  is  a  further  allusion  to  the  scheme  when,  in  com- 
pliance with  a  request  for  an  inventory  of  fortresses  and  troops, 
Sully  proposed  that  two  objects  of  policy  should  be,  first,  to 
transfer  the  Empire  to  some  family  other  than  the  Hapsburgs, 
and,  second,  to  confine  the  Hapsburgs  to  Spain.  When,  in  this 
year,  the  Cleves-Julich  succession  question  became  acute,  Sully 
relates  that  he  encouraged  Henry  to  commence  hostilities,  the 
French  king  having  now  secured  the  alliance  of  Savoy,  Venice, 
the  German  princes,  and  the  Low  Countries,  and  having  at  his 
disposal  an  army  of  150,000  men.  The  last  reference  is  in  1610, 
when  Sully  is  asked  to  put  his  proposals  on  record.  This  he  does 
by  enumerating  all  the  alliances  already  formed  against  Spain,  and 
suggests  a  scheme  for  dividing  captured  territory  among  the  allies 
when  the  Hapsburgs  shall  have  met  with  their  inevitable  defeat. 

Such  is  the  account  of  the  Grand  Design  as  given  by  Sully 


shortly  after  his  retirement.  As  it  stands,  it  contains  several 
inconsistencies  and  inventions :  in  particular,  the  account  of  the 
embassy  of  1603  is  more  imaginative  than  historical.  The  letters 
reproduced,  in  the  manuscript  edition,  to  authenticate  this  mission 
are  fabrications  (b),  and  the  secret  instructions  never  existed  but 
in  the  mind  of  Sully.  It  will  be  noticed  also  that  in  this  account 
responsibility  for  the  scheme  is  at  one  time  attributed  to  the 
monarch,  at  another  time  to  the  minister.  But,  on  the  whole, 
the  scheme  as  thus  evolved  is  not  unhistorical.  Henry  IV. 
certainly  did  meditate  great  designs  against  the  Hapsburgs:  he 
was  at  pains  to  build  up  a  system  of  European  alliances,  and  had 
he  been  spared  the  knife  of  Ravaillac  he  might  have  lived  to  see 
the  downfall  of  the  Empire.  There  is  indeed  ample  contemporary 
evidence  that  such  a  general  policy  was  attributed  to  him.  There 
exists  in  manuscript  (c)  an  account  of  a  conversation  between 
Henry  and  Lesdiguieres  on  October  17,  1609.  In  this  account, 
Henry  confessed  that  he  still  felt  young,  and  that  he  hoped  God 
would  give  him  other  ten  years  to  complete  his  work.  He 
compared  himself  to  an  architect  who  has  laid  the  foundations 
and  must  leave  to  a  successor  the  completion  of  the  edifice.  He 
wished  the  Dauphin  to  marry  a  daughter  of  the  Duke  of  Lorraine 
and  his  eldest  daughter  to  marry  a  prince  of  Savoy.  To  the  idea 
of  a  Spanish  marriage  he  declared  himself  resolutely  opposed, 
believing  that  no  marriage  policy  could  ever  remove  the  menace 
to  France  of  Spanish  ascendancy,  since  "  the  rise  of  the  one  must 
inevitably  be  the  ruin  of  the  other."  Finally,  he  hoped  for  the 
day  when  there  would  be  but  one  religion  in  France,  though  for 
the  present  he  was  content  to  use  Protestants  as  well  as 
Catholics.  Numerous  references  of  this  kind  are  to  be  found  in 
seventeenth-century  books.  The  Journal  of  Bassompierre,  the 
Histoire  Universelle  of  Agrippa  d'Aubigne*,  and  the  Memoirs 
attributed  to  Richelieu  (d)  and  Fontenay-Mareuil  (e)  allude  to 

(b)  This  has  been  conclusively  shown  by  the  independent  researches  of  Pfister 
and  Kukelhaus. 

(c)  Affaires  Etrangeres  France,  767,  f.  5,  quoted  in  Hanotaux,  Histoire  du 
Cardinal  de  Richelieu,  Vol.  I.,  p.  260. 

(d)  Eichelieu,  or  the  scribe   employed   to  compile  his   Memoires,  notes  that 
in  1610  Henry  IV.  was  in  his  fifty-eighth  year,  and  that  his  age  was  therefore 
the    most    serious    obstacle   to   the    Grand    Design    (Richelieu,    Memoires,    ed. 
Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  pp.  12 — 16). 

ie)  Memoires   (ed.  Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  pp.  9 — 12). 


such  designs  and  credit  Henry  IV.  with  the  ambition  of  raising 
France,  on  the  ruins  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire,  to  a  commanding 
position  in  Europe.  Matthieu,  in  his  Histoire  de  Henri  IV. 
(1631)  says  of  him:  "  Sans  les  inndelite"s  frangaises,  il  eusj)  fait 
une  partie  du  monde  francais,  comme  Probus  1'avait  fait  remain." 
As  thus  stated,  the  Grand  Design  resolves  itself  into  little 
more  than  a  historical  truism.  Ascendancy  in  the  councils 
of  Europe  had  traditionally  been  associated  with  the  country 
which  produced  such  monarchs  as-  Philip  Augustus,  St.  Louis, 
Philip  the  Fair,  and  Louis  XII.,  and  the  lead  taken  by 
France  in  the  Crusades  had  helped  to  confirm  this  political  pre- 
eminence. As  early  as  the  fourteenth  century,  a  French  jurist  (/) 
had  affirmed  that  supremacy  in  the  affairs  of  Europe  belonged  to 
the  French  monarchy  by  a  kind  of  natural  right,  "  ex  natives 
pronitatis  ad  melius  jure."  In  the  fifteenth  century,  George 
Podiebrad,  King  of  Bohemia  (1420 — 1471),  evolved  a  scheme  for 
maintaining  European  tranquillity  '(g),  and  addressed  himself  first 
of  all  to  the  King  of  France,  believing  that  his  approval  was  the 
chief  preliminary  requisite  for  the  success  of  such  schemes.  But 
Louis  XI  was  a  poor  patron,  benefiting  more  by  the  strife  of  his 
neighbours  than  by  their  concord.  The  years  of  anarchy  and 
dynastic  war  following  on  the  reigns  of  Louis  XII.-  and  Francis  I. 
deprived  French  kings  of  their  birthright.  With  the  restoration 
of  France  under  the  great  king  Henry  IV.,  it  was  not  unnatural 
that  the  tradition  should  be  revived. 

In  this  revival,  there  was  a  recrudescence  of  the  old  crusading 
spirit.  French  policy  since  the  time  of  Francis  I.  had  tended  to 
an  alliance  with  the  Turk,  whose  fleets  frequently  harried 
Hapsburg  possessions  on  the  Mediterranean  coasts,  and  for  this 
reason  it  is  unlikely  that  Henry  himself  ever  meditated  any 
serious  designs  against  the  Turks.  But  nevertheless  he  was 
probably  familiar  with  the  plan  for  a  crusade  proposed  in  1609  by 
a  Greek  Minotto  (h).  During^the  minority  of  Louis  XIII.,  such 
proposals  take  a  more  concrete  form.  The  Duke  of  Nevers, 

(/)  Jean  of  Jandun. 

(g)  The  scheme  was  drawn  up  by  Marini  in  De  Unione  Christianorum  contra 
Turcas.  See  Ter  Meulen,  Der  Gedanke  der  Internationalen  Organisation, 
pp.  108—123. 

(h)  Cf.  Zinkeisen,  Geschichte  des  Osmanischen  Reiches,  III.  859. 


induced  by  the  promises  of  the  Greeks,  actually  inaugurated  such 
a  crusade,  with  the  help  and  good  will  of  France,  but  the  attempt 
proved  abortive.  A  French  ambassador  (i)  in  Constantinople 
compiled  a  Short  Discourse  on  the  Surest  Means  of  Ruining  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  Father  Joseph — Richelieu's  understudy  and 
prompter — meditated  for  long  the  project  of  expelling  the  Turks 
from  Europe,  and  even  composed  a  Turciade.  At  the  time  when 
Sully  was  compiling  his  Memoirs,  a  crusade  against  the  infidel 
was  so  far  from  being  a  fantastic  scheme  as  to  be  almost  a  common- 
place of  politics. 

If  it  be  added  that  the  career  of  Eichelieu  must  have  proved  an 
inspiration  to  a  man  of  Sully 's  type,  we  shall  have  completed  our 
enumeration  of  the  contemporary  influences  that  are  evident  in 
the  first  and  manuscript  edition  of  the  Memoirs.  Richelieu 
revived  and  amplified  the  policy  of  Henry  IV.,  which  had  been 
set  aside  during  the  regency  of  Marie  de  Medicis.  Before  his 
death  in  1643,  the  prerogatives  of  the  Empire  had  been  con- 
siderably diminished,  Spain  had  become  almost  isolated,  the 
Hapsburgs  were  being  forced  back  on  their  hereditary  lands,  and 
French  gold  was  already  corrupting  the  German  princes, 
Protestant  and  Catholic  alike.  In  a  measure  it  is  true  to  say  that 
the  real  Grand  Design  was  the  inspiration  and  achievement  of 
Richelieu,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  later  edition  of  Sully 's 
Memoirs — the  only  edition  that  was  printed — was  prepared  in 
the  period  between  1620  and  1635,  when  the  career  of  the  great 
minister  was  of  surpassing  interest  to  every  patriotic  Frenchman, 
and  especially  to  one  imbued,  as  was  Sully,  with  the  glorious 
traditions  of  the  reign  of  Henry  IV. 

Thus,  despite  certain  inaccuracies  and  inconsistencies,  the 
original  draft  of  Sully 's  Memoirs,  so  far  from  containing  any 
fanciful  scheme  for  remaking  the  map  of  Europe  and  introducing 
an  era  of  perpetual  peace,  simply  reflects  the  dynastic  ambitions 
of  the  Bourbons  as  pursued  by  Henri  IV.  and  Richelieu.  But 
after  1617  Sully  returned  to  his  'memoir- writing  and,  whether 
because  of  impaired  mental  and  moral  powers  or  whether  because 
events  seemed  to  be  leading  to  the  complete  victory  of 
France,  he  made  very  important  changes  in  the  revised  version. 

(i)  De  Br&ves,  Discours  abrege  des  asveurez  moyens  de  miner  la  monarchic 
des  princes  Ottomans  (n.  d). 


Imagination  now  freely  supplements  fact,  documentary  evidence 
is  carefully  forged  wherever  it  might  help  to  give  an  appearance 
of  verisimilitude,  and,  quite  unconscious  of  discrepancies  and 
inconsistencies,  a  far  more  wonderful  Grand  Design  is  evolved. 
To  complete  the  illusion,  Henry  IV.  is  declared  its  author  as  the 
scheme  seems  more  befitting  a  -great  monarch  than  a  cautious 
financier.  It  is  this  revised  version  that  was  printed  (the  first  part 
in  1638,  the  second  part  in  1662),  and  one  reason  for  Sully  deciding 
to  make  this  version  public  may  have  been  his  desire  to  be  revenged 
on  Scipion  Dupleix,  who,  in  his  official  history  of  Henry's  reign, 
had  carefully  underestimated  the  part  played  by  Sully.  In  these 
printed  texts,  the  Grand  Design  appears  only  in  scattered 
fragments,  but,  nevertheless,  so  fully  and  carefully  were  they 
"documented"  that  most  contemporary  readers  were  led  to 
believe  that  Henry  IV.  really  had  entertained  a  scheme  for 
securing  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  genuineness  of  the  printed 
Memoirs  was  explicitly  affirmed  by  Hardouin  de  Per^fixe  in 
1661  (fc),  and  the  only  pre-nineteenth-century  writers  who 
expressed  their  doubts  were  Vittorio  Siri  (I)  and  St.  Simon  (w). 

It  is  therefore  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  that  in  the  eighteenth 
century — a  period  as  uncritical  as  the  seventeenth  is  pedantic* — 
the  Memoirs  of  Sully  were  accepted  at  their  face  value.  Voltaire 
expressly  commended  the  writings  of  Sully  and  Perefixe  as 
reliable  accounts  of  Henry's  reign  (n).  The  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre 
based  his  "  Projet  de  Paix  Perpetuelle  "  on  the  assumption  that 
the  Grand  Design  was  authentic.  The  finishing  touch  was  given 
in  1745,  when  the  Abbe  de  1'Ecluse  des  Loges  published  a  new 
edition  of  the  Memoirs,  in  which  all  the  scattered  fragments 
relating  to  the  Grand  Design  were  collected  together  and  put 
into  one  chapter  at  the  end  (numbered  XXX.);  In  doing  this,  the 
Abbe  was  taking  an  unwarrantable  liberty  with  his  text,  for  Sully 
had  never  presented  the  scheme  as  a  consistent  whole;  but 
undoubtedly  this  helped  to  popularise  the  supposed  plan  of  a 
popular  king.  By  1778  this  compilation  had  gone  through  five 

(k)  Histoire  du  Roi  Henri  le  Grand,  Amsterdam,  1661,  p.  383. 
(1)  Memorie  Recondite    (1677),   Vol.   I.,  p.   29.      According   to   Siri,    Sully 's 
Memoirs  are  "  sparse  di  chimere  e  inverisimili." 

(m)  ParalUle  des  trois  premiers  rois  Bourbons  (ed.  Faugere,  pp.  137 — 145). 
(n)  Essai  sur  les  mceurs  et  V esprit  des  nations,  Chapter  CLfXXIV. 


editions,  and,  as  thus  presented,  the  Grand  Design  was  elevated 
to  the  level  of  a  philosophical  system.  Rousseau  said  that  it 
was  not  good  enough  for  Europe,  because  Europe  was  not  good, 
enough  for  it  (o) ;  and  even  Bentham  may  have  been  sub- 
consciously influenced  when  he  entrusted  the  inauguration  of  his 
European  fraternity  of  utilitarian  States  to  the  combined 
influence  of  France  and  England.  Echoes  of  Sully  may  be 
detected  here  and  there  in  Kant.  The  direct  inspiration  of 
Sully  can  be  traced  in  the  peace  projects  of  more  obscure  writers, 
from  the  Englishman  Bellers  (p)  and  the  German  Rachel  (q)  to 
the  Frenchman  Saintard  (r).  The  scheme  attributed  to  Cardinal 
Alberoni  is  little  more  than  a  plagiarism.  Sully 's  "Grand  Design" 
is  thus  the  starting-point  of  many  of  the  schemes  which  have  since 
been  put  forward  for  establishing  European  peace,  and  this  because 
it  was  the  first  proposal,  based  on  considerable  knowledge  of 
European  politics,  which  accepted  facts  and  which  presupposed 
that  peace  may  be  not  only  a  moral  ideal  but  a  practical  blessing. 
If  States  can  no  longer  be  influenced  by  religion,  they  may  yet  be 
persuaded  by  political  economy.  That  is  the  measure  of  Sully 's 
difference  from  his  predecessors  and  the  reason  for  his  influence 
in  later  times. 

.TJ  The  Grand  Design  is  based  on  two  things — an  acceptance,  so 
far  as  possible,  of  the  status  quo,  and  an  appeal  to  the  innate- 
selfishness  of  man.  The  three  standard  religions  (Catholic, 
Lutheran,  and  Calvinist)  are  admitted ;  the  constitutional  forms, 
whether  monarchical  or  republican,  of  the  European  States  are 
accepted  as  standards,  and  thus  there  is  to  be  a  minimum  of 
dislocation  when  Europe  is  united  in  the  great  federation  of 
hereditary  monarchies,  elective  monarchies,  and  republics.  There 
is,  moreover,  evidence  of  some  historical  insight  in  the  details  of 
the  scheme.  Holland  and  Switzerland  are  to  be  confirmed  in  their 
republican  traditions;  Italy  is  to  be  freed  from  the  foreigner. 
The  Pope  is  to  become  a  secular  prince — an  intelligent  apprecia- 
tion of  some  later  papal  developments;  and  the  Duchy  of  Savoy 
is  to  be  made  a  monarchy — perhaps  the  earliest  anticipation  of 

(o)  In  his  Essay  on  St.  Pierre's  Projet  de  Paix  Perpetuelle. 
(p)  Some  reasons  for  an  European  State  Proposed  to  the  Powers  of  Europe, 

(q)  De  Jure  Natures  et  Gentium  Dissertationes,  1676. 

(r)  Roman  Politique  sur  Vetat  present  des  affaires  de  VAmerique,  1757. 


the  great  destiny  in  store  for  that  house.  Kussia  is  considered  as 
a  power  which  might  more  legitimately  develop  in  Asia  than  in 
Europe,  and  as,  in  any  case,  too  risky  a  speculation  for  European 
investment.  As  intelligent  knowledge  of  contemporary  Europe 
is  the  basis  of  the  scheme,  so  the  inducement  for  prospective 
partners  is  one  which  even  the  most  bellicose  could  scarcely 
refuse — the  promise  of  additional  territory,  and  this  at  the 
expense  of  the  House  of  Austria.  It  does  not  occur  to  Sully  that 
by  dividing  up  Hapsburg  territory  he  might  create  a  permanent 
tradition  of  revanche.  The  military  forces  of  this  great  European 
confederacy  are  to  be  directed  to  one  object — the  expulsion  of  the 
Turk  from  Europe. 

Within  this  confederation  there  would  be  freedom  of  commerce, 
and  supreme  control  would  be  vested  in  a  senate  of  about  sixty-six 
persons  elected  every  three  years  from  the  participating  States, 
a  certain  number  of  representatives  being  assigned  to  each.  There 
would  be  subordinate  and  local  assemblies :  the  decisions  of  the 
general  senate  only  would  be  "final  and  irrevocable  decrees." 
The  Grand  Design  has  for  its  backing  a  composite  army,  but 
whether  this  would  be  permanent  and  employed  to  enforce,  if 
necessary,  the  decisions  of  the  League,  is  not  quite  clear  from 
the  text. 

Sully 's  preference  for  a  city  of  Central  Europe  as  the  permanent 
seat  of  the  senate's  activities  is  noteworthy  as,  in  some  respects, 
an  anticipation  of  the  part  to  be  played  in  later  irenist  ideals  by 
the  Germanic  Confederation.  Within  a  few  years  of  his  death, 
the  League  of  the  Rhine,  in  attempting  to  revive  something  of 
German  nationalism,  attempted  also  to  create  a  guarantee  for  the 
peace  of  Europe  by  uniting  (with  German  princes)  that  power 
which  was  most  likely  to  have  "  annexationist  "  designs  (at 
German  expense),  and  whose  ambitions  might  thus  be  neutralised 
by  compact  rather  than  by  challenge.  Throughout  the  eighteenth 
century,  indeed,  the  very  existence  of  the  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion was  regarded  as  making  for  European  peace.  Its  geographical 
position  was  held  to  impose  a  restraint  on  ambitious  neighbours, 
and  at  least  one  observer  maintained  that  its  weight  secured  that 
equilibrium  to  which,  despite  wars,  Europe  was  (in  this  view) 
always  automatically  restored.  It  is  not  less  noteworthy  that, 



of  the  German  States,  Prussia  was  considered  the  most  important 
as  a  model  of  good  government  and  as  the  strongest  rivet  in  this 
great  bulwark  against  anarchy  and  aggression.  Mirabeau  (s) 
wrote:  "Si  la  Prusse  perit,  Tart  de  gouverner  retournera  vers 
1'enfance";  and  his  admiration  was  shared  by  French  political 
thinkers  from  Voltaire  to  Rousseau. 

It  is  thus  in.  its  concreteness  and  in  its  anticipation  of  several 
later  doctrines  of  importance  that  Sully 's  Grand  Design  is  of  most 
interest  to  the  modern  Student  of  international  relations.  To 
criticise  it  in  points  of  detail  would  scarcely  be  fair,  especially 
as  the  scheme  was  only  gradually  evolved  and  was  never  reduced 
by  its  author  to  a  studied  form.  No  doubt  one  of  the  weakest 
parts  of  the  Design  is  that  the_Senate — merely  an  echo  of  the 
Imperial  Diet — would  lose  its  authority  as  soon  as  litigants  found 
that  it  was  not  in  their  interests  to  obey  its  behests,  but  the  same 
weakness  may  be  detected  in  some  more  modern  projects.  More- 
over, there  is  an  appeal  to  base  motives  in  the  inception  of  the 
scheme,  the  participants,  with  the  possible  exception  of  France 
and  England,  being  brought  together  by  the  promise  of  shares  in 
an  Empire  about  to  be  dismembered.  But  Sully  may  have 
regarded  that  as  means  to  an  end  and,  like  a  true  optimist,  he 
may  have  hoped  that  once  his  League  was  established  it  would, 
by  a  gradual  and  educative  process,  eliminate  rapacity  and 
aggression  from  international  politics.  For  it  is  Sully 's  greatest 
merit  that  he  preached  certain  truths,  a  respect  for  which  in  the 
minds  of  responsible  statesmen  might  have  saved  Europe  from 
many  years  of  disaster  and  crime.  Long  before  Montesquieu  and 
Bousseau  this  austere  Huguenot  proclaimed  that  the  happiness 
and  success  of  a  nation  may  be  in  inverse  ratio  to  its  territorial 
extent  (t),  that  wars  of  aggrandisement  defeat  their  own  object, 
and  that  in  great  European  struggles  the  plight  of  the  victor  may 
be  at  least  as  unhappy  as  that  of  the  conquered  (u).  Who  can 
say  that  these  axioms  have  yet  been  understood  by  those  who  are 

(s)  In  the  conclusion  to  his  Monarchic  Prussienne. 

(t)  See  infra,  p.  24. 

(u)  Cf.  Memoirs,  Bk.  IX.  (1598).  "I  am  not  afraid  to  say  that  in  the 
present  state  of  Europe  it  is  almost  equally  unhappy  for  its  princes  to  succeed 
or  miscarry  in  their  enterprises,  and  that  the  true  way  of  weakening  a  powerful 
neighbour  is  not  to  carry  off  his  spoils  but  to  leave  them  to  be  shared  by 


entrusted  with  the  direction  of  international  policy  in  Europe? 
Who  can  dispel  from  our  minds  the  nightmare  of  a  future  world- 
war  of  revanche  or  territorial  greed?  Sully 's  Grand  Design  is 
unsound,  unhistorical,  and  out-of-date,  but  it  is  because  it  has 
still  some  lessons  for  a  world  grown  sick  of  war  that  its  reprint 
here  may  be  justified. 


The  text  used  in  this  reprint  is  that  of  the  eighteenth -century 
English  translation  (6  vols.,  London,  1778,  and  Dublin,  1781). 
This  text  was  reprinted  with  a  few  changes  in  Bonn's  series 
(4  vols.,  1892),  and  it  should  be  noted  that  the  chapter  here 
reprinted  (numbered  XXX.)  is  the  composite  chapter  first  inserted 
by  the  Abbe  de  1'Ecluse  des  Loges  in  his  edition  of  1745.  It  is 
through  this  composite  chapter  that  the  Grand  Design  is  most 
familiar  to  modern  times,  and  so  it  has  been  reprinted  here.  A 
few  minor  changes  have  been  made  in  the  English  version  where 
it  seemed  obscure,  even  at  the  expense  of  giving  a  somewhat  free 
translation  of  the  original.  The  eighteenth -century  footnotes 
(mostly  valueless)  have  been  omitted  and  a  few  elementary  notes 
inserted  in  their  place. 

A.  Editions  of  the  Memoirs. 

1.  Memoires  des  sages  et  royales  oeconomdes  d'Estat  domes- 

tiques,  politiques  et  militaires  de  Henry  le  Grand. 
Vols.  I.  and  II.,  (Chateau  de  Sully).  1638. 

2.  Ibid.    Vols.  III.  and  IV.    Paris,  1662.    Two  volumes  in  one. 

3.  Ibid.    8  vols.     Kouen,  1663. 

4.  Ibid.     4  vols.     Paris,  1664. 

5.  Memoires    de  Maximilian   de    Bethune,    due   de   Sully  .   .   . 

mis  en  ordre  avec  des  remarques  par  M.L.D.L.D.L. 
[Abbe  de  1'Ecluse  des  Loges.]  London,  3  vols.  (Sub- 
sequent editions  in  1747  (3  vols.),  1752  (8  vols.),  1778 
(10  vols.),  and  1778  (revised,  8  vols.). 

6.  Memoires  du  Due  de  Sully.     Paris,  1822.     6  vols. 

7.  Memoires  des  sages  et  royales  oeconomies  d'Estat,  domes- 

tiques,  politiques  et  militaires  de  Henry  le  Grand  (in 
Michaud  et  Poujoulat,  "  Nouvelle  Collection  des 
Memoires  pour  servir  a  I'histoire  de  France,"  2nd  series, 
Vols.  II.  and  III).  Paris,  1850. 

16  THE    GRAND    DESIGN   OF    HENRY   IV. 

B.  Monographs  relating  to  the  Grand  Design. 

1.  MORITZ    HITTER. — Die    Memoiren    Sully s    und    der    grosst'- 

Plan  Heinrichs  IV.  (in  Abhandlungen  der  historischen 
Classe  der  kgl.  bayerischen  Akademie  der  Wissen- 
schaften.  Bd.  XI.  Abth.  III.,  1870). 

2.  CORNELIUS. — Der  Grosse  Plan  Heinrichs  IV.  von  Frankreich. 

("  Miinchener  Historischer  Jahrbuch,"  1886). 

3.  T.    KUKELHAUS. — Der    Ursprung    des    Planes    vom    ewigen 

Frieden.     Berlin,  1892. 

4.  C.  PFISTER. — Les  Oeconomies  Royales  de  Sully  (in  "  Eevue 

Historique  ").     Vols.   54—56.     1894. 

C.  General  Works  for  Reference. 

1.  LAVISSE.— Histoire  de  France.     Vol.  VI.,  Part  2. 

2.  HANOTAUX. — Histoire    du    Cardinal    de    Richelieu.     2    vols. 


3.  FAGNIEZ. — Le  Pere  Joseph  et  Richelieu.     1894. 

4.  TER  MEULEN. — Der  Gedanke  der  International  en  Organisa- 

tion.    1917. 






As  this  part  of  these  Memoirs  will  be  chiefly  taken  up  with  an 
account  of  the  great  design  of  Henry  IV.  or  'the  political  scheme, 
by  which  he  proposed  to  govern,  not  only  France,  but  all 
Europe,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  begin  it  with  some  general 
reflections  on  the  French  monarchy  and  on  the  Roman  empire. 
We  know  that  on  the  ruins  of  the  Roman  empire  were  formed 
not  only  the  French  but  all  the  other  powers  comprising  the 
Christian  world. 

If  we  consider  all  those  successive  changes  which  Rome  has 
suffered  from  the  year  of  its  foundation,  its  infancy,  youth  and 
virility ;  its  declension,  fall  and  final  ruin ;  these  vicissitudes,  which 
it  experienced  in  common  with  the  great  monarchies  by  which 
it  was  preceded,  would  almost  incline  one  to  believe  that  empires, 
like  all  other  sublunary  things,  are  subject  to  be  the  sport  and  at 
last  to  sink  under  the  pressure  of  time.  Extending  this  idea  still 
further,  we  perceive  that  all  states  are  liable  to  be  disturbed  in 
their  careers  by  certain  extraordinary  incidents  which  might  be 
termed  epidemic  disorders.  These  frequently  hasten  the  destruc- 
tion of  empires  and,  their  cure  by  this  discovery  becoming  easier, 
we  may  at  least  save  some  of  them  from  catastrophes  so  fatal. 

But    if  we   endeavour   to  discover   more   visible    and    natural 

causes  of  the  ruin  of  this  vast  and  formidable  empire,  we  shall 

perhaps  soon  perceive  they  were  produced  by  a  deviation  from 

those  wise  laws  and  that  simplicity  of  manners,  which  were  the 

G.S.  2 


origin  of  all  its  grandeur,  into  luxury,  avarice  and  ambition. 
Yet  there  was,  finally,  another  cause,  the  effect  of  which  could 
hardly  have  been  prevented  or  foreseen  by  the  utmost  human 
wisdom ;  I  mean,  the  irruptions  of  those  vast  bodies  of  barbarous 
people,  Goths,  Vandals,  Huns,  Herulians,  Rugians,  Lombards, 
&c.  from  whom,  both  separately  and  united,  the  Roman  empire 
received  such  violent  shocks  that  it  was  at  last  overthrown  by 
them.  Rome  was  three  times  sacked  by  these  Barbarians;  under 
Honorius,  by  Alaric,  chief  of  the  Goths;  by  Genseric,  king  of  the 
Vandals,  under  Martin;  and  under  Justinian,  by  Totila  and  the 
Goths.  Now  if  it  be  true  that,  after  this,  the  city  retained  only 
the  shadow  of  what  she  had  been;  if  we  must  regard  her  as 
divested  of  the  empire  of  the  world,  when  her  weakness  and  the 
abuses  of  her  government  made  her  fall  to  be  looked  upon,  not 
simply  as  inevitable,  but  as  very  near,  and,  in  fact,  already 
arrived ;  the  date  of  her  fall  may  then  be  marked  long  before  the 
reign  of  Valentinian  III.  to  whom  it  will  be  doing  a  favour  to 
call  him  the  last  emperor  of  the  West.  For  several  of  those 
emperors  whom  he  succeeded  were,  in  reality,  no  better  than 
tyrants,  by  whom  the  empire  was  torn  and  divided,  and  the 
shattered  remnants  left  to  be  the  spoil  of  the  Barbarians,  who, 
indeed,  by  their  conquests,  acquired  an  equal  right  to  them. 

Rome,  nevertheless,  by  intervals,  beheld  some  faint  appearances 
of  a  revival;  those  of  which  she  was  most  sensible  were  under 
the  reign  of  the  great  Constantine,  whose  victories  once  more 
united  this  Vast  body  under  one  head.  But  when  he  transported 
the  seat  of  his  empire  from  Rome  to  Constantinople,  he,  by  that 
step,  contributed  more  to  the  destruction  of  a  work  which  had 
cost  him  so  much  labour  than  all  the  ill  conduct  of  his  pre- 
decessors had  been  able  to  effect;  and  this  even  he  rendered 
irremediable,  by  dividing  his  empire  equally  between  his  three 
sons.  Theodosius,  who  by  good  fortune,  or  from  his  great  valour, 
found  himself  in  the  same  circumstances  with  Constantine, 
would  not  perhaps  have  committed  the  same  fault,  had  he  not 
been  influenced  by  the  force  of  Constantine's  example;  but  this 
in  a  manner  necessarily  obliged  him  to  divide  his  empire  in  two ; 
Arcadius  had  the  East,  Honorius  the  West :  and  from  that  time 
there  never  were  any  hopes  nor  opportunity  of  reuniting  them. 


According  to  the  order  of  nature,  by  which  the  destruction  of 
one  kingdom  becomes  the  instrument  for  the  production  of  others ; 
so,  in  proportion  as  the  most  distant  members  of  the  empire  of 
the  East  fell  off  from  it,  from  thence  there  arose  kingdoms; 
though  indeed  they  did  not  at  first  bear  that  rank.  The  most 
ancient  of  these  (its  origin  appearing  to  have  been  in  the  eighth 
year  of  the  empire  of  Honorius)  is  undoubtedly  that  which  was 
founded  in  Gaul  by  the  French,  so  called  from  Franconia,  from 
whence  they  were  invited  by  the  "Gauls,  inhabitants  of  the 
countries  about  the  Moselle,  to  assist  them  in  their  deliverance 
from  the  oppression  of  the  Roman  armies.  It  being  a  custom 
among  these  Franks  or  French,  to  confer  the  title  of  king  upon 
whatever  person  they  chose  to  be  their  leader;  if  the  first  or 
second  of  these  chiefs  have  not  borne  it,  it  is  certain,  at  least, 
that  the  third,  Merovius,  and  more  particularly  Clovis,  who  was 
the  fifth,  were  invested  with  it.  Some  of  them  supported  the 
royal  title  with  so  much  glory,  including  Pepin  and  Charles 
Martel  (to  whom  it  would  be  doing  an  injustice  to  refuse  this 
dignity),  that  their  worthy  successor  Charlemagne,  in  Gaul, 
revived  an  imperfect  image  of  the  now  extinguished  empire  in  the 
West.  This  indeed  was  facilitated  by  those  natural  advantages 
France  enjoys  of  numerous  inhabitants  trained  to  war  and  a  great 
plenty  of  all  things  serving  the  different  necessities  of  life,  joined 
to  a  very  great  conveniency  for  commerce,  arising  from  its 
situation,  rendering  it  the  centre  of  four  of  the  principal  powers 
of  Europe;  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  and  Britain,  with  the  Low 

Let  us  here  just  say  one  word  upon  the  three  races  which 
compose  the  succession  of  our  kings :  in  the  first  of  them  I  find 
only  Merovius,  Clovis  I.  and  Clovis  II. ;  Charles  Martel,  Pippin 
the  Short,  and  Charlemagne  in  the  second,  who  have  raised  them- 
selves above  the  common  level  of  their  race.  Take  away  these 
six  from  the  thirty-five,  which  we  compute  in  these  two  races, 
and  all  the  rest,  from  their  vices  or  their  incapacity,  appeared 
to  have  been  either  wicked  kings,  or  but  the  shadow  of  kings; 
though  among  them  we  may  distinguish  some  good  qualities  in 
Sigebert  and  Dagobert,  and  a  very  great  devotion  in  Lewis 
the  Debonnair,  which,  however,  ended  in  his  repenting  the 


loss  of  empire  and  his  kingdom,  together  with  his  liberty,  in  a 

The  Carlovingian  race  having  reigned  obscurely,  the  crown 
then  descended  upon  a  third  (a);  the  four  first  kings  of  which,  in 
my  opinion,  appear  to  have  been  perfect  models  of  wise  and  good 
government.  The  kingdom  which  came  under  their  dominion 
had  lost  much  of  its  original  splendour,  for  from  its  immense 
extent  in  the  time  of  Charlemagne,  it  was  reduced  to  nearly 
the  same  bounds  which  it  has  at  this  day.  There  was  this 
difference,  however,  that  though  these  kings  might  have  desired 
to  restore  the  ancient  limits  of  their  territories,  they  had  no  means 
of  doing  so,  since  the  form  of  government  was  such  that  the 
monarchs  were  subject  to  the  great  men  of  the  realm  who  had  a 
right  to  choose  and  even  govern  their  sovereigns.  The  conduct 
therefore  which  they  pursued  wras  to  condemn  arbitrary  power 
to  an  absolute  silence;  and,  in  its  place,  to  substitute  equity 
itself :  a  kind  of  dominion  which  never  excites  envy.  Nothing 
now  was  done  without  the  consent  of  the  great  men  and  the 
principal  cities,  and  almost  always  in  consequence  of  the  decision 
of  an  assembly  of  the  estates.  A  conduct  so  moderate  and 
prudent  put  an  end  to  all  factions,  and  stifled  all  conspiracies, 
which  are  fatal  to  -the  state  or  the  sovereign.  Regularity, 
economy,  a  distinction  of  merit,  strict  observance  of  justice,  all 
the  virtues  which  we  suppose  necessary  qualifications  for  the  good 
of  a  family,  were  what  characterized  this  new  government,  and 
produced  what  was  never  before  beheld,  and  what  perhaps  we 
may  never  see  again,  an  uninterrupted  peace  (b)  for  one  hundred 
and  twenty-two  years.  What  the  Capetians  gained  by  this  for 
themselves  was  the  advantage  of  introducing  into  their  house  a 
jreditary  right  to  the  crown,  and  this  could  never  have  been  pro- 
cured for  them  by  the  sole  authority  of  the  Salic  law.  But  they 
nevertheless  thought  it  a  necessary  precaution  not  to  declare  their 
eldest  sons  for  their  successors  till  they  had  modestly  asked  the 
consent  of  the  people,  preceding  it  by  a  kind  of  election,  usually 
having  them  crowned  in  their  own  life-time  and  seated  with  them 
upon  the  throne. 

(a)  That  is,  the  Capetian  race. 

(b)  The   period   between   the    accession   of   Hugh   Capet    (987)    and   that   of 
Louis  VI.  (1108). 


Philip  II.  whom  Lewis  VII.  his  father  caused  to  be  crowned, 
and  reign  with  him  in  this  manner  was  the  first  who  neglected  to 
observe  this  ceremony  between  the  sovereign  and  his  people. 
Several  victories,  obtained  over  his  neighbours  and  subjects 
having  gained  him  the  surname  of  Augustus,  served  to  open  him 
a  passage  to  absolute  power,  and  a  notion  of  the  fitness  and 
legality  of  this  power,  by  the  assistance  of  favourites,  ministers 
and  others,  became  afterwards  so  strongly  imprinted  in  his 
successors,  that  they  looked  upon  it  as  a  mark  of  good  policy  to 
act  contrary  to  those  maxims,  the  general  and  particular  utility 
of  which  had  been  so  effectually  confirmed  by  the  experience  of 
his  predecessors.  And  this  they  did  without  any  fear  or  perhaps 
without  any  conception  of  the  fatal  consequences  which  such  a 
proceeding  must  necessarily  incur  at  the  hands  of  a  nation  which 
adores  its  liberty.  This  they  might  have  deduced  from  the  means 
to  which  the  people  had  immediate  recourse  when  they  saw  their 
liberties  threatened.  The  kings  could  never  obtain  of  their  people 
any  other  than  that  kind  of  constrained  obedience  which  always 
inclines  them  to  embrace  with  eagerness  all  opportunities  of 
mutiny.  This  was  the  source  of  a  thousand  bloody  wars :  that 
by  which  almost  all  France  was  ravaged  by  the  English;  that 
which  we  had  with  Italy,  Burgundy,  Spain.  All  of  them  can  be 
attributed  to  no  other  causes  than  the  civil  dissensions  by  which 
they  were  preceded  and  here  the  weakest  side,  stifling  the 
voice  of  honour,  and  the  interest  of  the  nation,  constantly  called 
in  foreigners  to  assist  them  in  the  support  of  their  tottering 
liberties.  These  were  shameful  and  fatal  remedies :  but  from 
that  time  they  were  constantly  employed,  down  even  to  our 
times,  by  the  house  of  Lorraine,  in  a  league,  for  which  religion 
was  nothing  more  than  the  pretence  (c).  Another  evil,  which  may 
at  first  appear  to  be  of  a  different  kind,  but  which,  in  my  opinion, 
proceeds  from  the  same  source,  was  a  general  corruption  of 
manners,  a  thirst  for  riches  and  a  most  shameful  degree  of 

(c)  Sully  may  here  be  thinking  of  the  affair  of  the  bishopric  of  Strasburg 
(1595).  In  that  year  Henry,  as  arbitrator,  divided  the  episcopal  domains 
between  the  Protestant  Elector  of  Brandenburg  and  the  Catholic  Charles  of 
Lorraine.  The  latter  refused  to  adhere  to  this,  and,  by  appointing  as  his 
coadjutor  the  Archduke  Leopold,  cousin  of  the  Emperor  Kudolph,  was  bidding 
for  the  support  of  France's  enemy. 


luxury:  these,  sometimes  separately,  and  sometimes  united,  were 
alternate  causes  and  effects  of  many  of  our  miseries. 

Thus,  in  a  few  words,  I  have  exposed  the  various  species  of 
our  bad  policy  with  respect  both  to  the  form  of  the  government, 
successively  subjected  to  the  will  of  the  people,  the  soldiers,  the 
nobles,  the  states  and  the  kings,  and  in  regard  to  the  persons 
likewise  of  these  last,  whether  dependent,  elective,  hereditary, 
or  absolute. 

From  the  picture  here  laid  before  us  we  may  be  enabled  to 
form  our  judgment  upon  the  third  race  of  our  kings :  we  may  find 
a  thousand  things  to  admire  in  Philip  Augustus,  Saint-Lewis, 
Philip  le  Bel,  Charles  the  Wise,  Charles  VII.  and  Lewis  XII. 
But  it  is  to  be  lamented  that  so  many  virtues  or  great  qualities 
have  been  exercised  upon  no  better  principles ;  with  what  pleasure 
might  we-  bestow  upon  them  the  titles  of  great  kings,  could  we 
but  conceal  that  their  people  were  miserable  :  what  might  we  not, 
in  particular,  say  of  Lewis  IX.  ?  Of  the  forty-four  years  which 
he  reigned,  the  first  twenty  of  them  exhibit  a  scene  not  unworthy 
of  comparison  with  the  last  eleven  of  Henry  the  Great.  But  I 
am  afraid  all  their  glory  will  appear  to  have  been  destroyed  in  the 
twenty-four  following;  wherein  it  appears  that  the  excessive 
taxes  upon  the  subjects,  to  satisfy  an  ill-judged  and  destructive 
devotion;  immense  sums  transported  into  the  most  distant 
countries,  for  the  ransom  of  prisoners;  so  many  thousand  subjects 
sacrificed ;  so  many  illustrious  houses  extinguished ;  caused  a 
universal  mourning  throughout  France,  and  altogether  a  general 

Let  us  for  once,  if  it  is  possible,  fix  our  principles;  and  being, 
from  long  experience,  convinced  that  the  happiness  of  mankind 
can  never  arise  from  war  (of  which  we  ought  to  have  been 
persuaded  long  ago),  let  us  upon  this  principle  take  a  cursory 
View  of  the  history  of  our  monarchy.  We  will  pass  by  the  wars 
of  Clovis  and  his  predecessors,  because  they  seem  to  have  been 
in  some  degree  necessary  to  confirm  the  recent  foundations  of  the 
monarchy:  but  what  shall  we  say  of  those  wars  in  which  the 
four  sons  of  Clovis,  the  four  sons  of  Clotaire  I.  and  their  descend- 
ants were  engaged,  during  the  uninterrupted  course  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty  years?  and  of  those  also,  by  which,  for  the 


space  of  on©  hundred  seventy-two  other  years,  commencing  with 
Lewis  le  Debonnaire,  the  kingdom  was  harassed  and  torn?  What 
follows  is  still  worse.  The  slightest  knowledge  of  our  history  is" 
sufficient  to  convince  any  one  that  there  was  no  real  tranquillity 
in  the  kingdom  from  Henry  III.  to  the  peace  of  Vervins :  and,  in\ 
short,  all  this  long  period  may  be  called  a,  war  of  nearly  four  \ 
hundred  years'  duration  (d).  After  this  examination  (from 
whence  it  incontestibly  appears  that  our  kings  have  seldom 
thought  of  any  thing  but  how  to  carry  on  their  wars)  we  cannot 
but  be  scrupulous  in  bestowing  on  them  the  title  of  Truly  Great 
kings;  though  we  shall,  nevertheless,  render  them  all  the  justice 
which  appears  to  have  been  their  due.  For  I  confess  (as  indeed 
it  would  be  unjust  to  attribute  to  them  alone,  a  crime  which  was 
properly  that  of  all  Europe)  that  several  of  these  princes  were 
sometimes  in  such  circumstances  as  rendered  the  wars  just,  and 
even  necessary  :  and  from  hence,  when  indeed  there  were  no  other 
means  to  obtain  it,  they  acquired  a  true  and  lasting  glory.  More- 
over, from  the  manner  in  which  several  of  these  wars  were 
foreseen,  prepared  for  and  conducted,  we  may  in  their  councils 
discover  such  master-strokes  of  policy,  and  in  their  persons  such 
noble  instances  of  courage,  as  are  deserving  of  our  highest  praises. 
From  whence  then  can  proceed  the  error  of  so  many  exploits,  in 
appearance  so  glorious,  though  the  effect  of  them  has  generally 
been  the  devastation  both  of  France  and  all  Europe?  I  repeat  it 
again,  of  all  Europe,  which  even  yet  seems  scarce  sensible  that 
in  her  present  situation,  a  situation  in  which  she  has  been  for 
several  centuries,  every  attempt  tending  to  her  subjection, 
or  only  to  the  too  considerably  augmenting  of  any  one  of  her 
principal  monarchies  at  the  expense  of  the  others,  can  never  be 
any  other  than  a  chimerical  and  impossible  enterprise.  There  are 
none  of  these  monarchies  but  whose  destruction  would  require  a 
concurrence  of  causes  infinitely  superior  to  all  human  force.  The 
whole,  therefore,  of  what  seems  proper  and  necessary  to  be  done, 
is  to  support  them  all  in  a,  kind  of  equilibrium;  and  whatever 
prince  thinks,  and  in  consequence  acts  otherwise,  may  indeed 

(d)  Including  the  twenty-two  years  between  the  accession  of  Henri  III.  and 
the  Peace  of  Vervins,  this  gives  a  total  period  of  354  years. 


cause  torrents  of  blood  to  flow  through  all  Europe,  but  he  will 
never  be  able  to  change  her  form. 

When  I  observed  that  the  extent  of  France  is  not  now  so 
considerable  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Charlemagne,  my  intention 
was  not  that  this  diminution  should  be  considered  as  a  mis- 
fortune. In  an  age  when  we  feel  the  sad  effects  of  having  had 
ambitious  princes  for  our  kings,  were  all  to  concur  in  flattering 
this  fatal  ambition,  it  would  be  the  cause  of  still  greater  evils; 
and  it  may  be  generally  observed  that  the  larger  the  extent  of 
kingdoms,  the  more  they  are  subject  to  great  revolutions  and 
misfortunes  (e).  The  basis  of  the  tranquillity  of  our  own  country, 
in  particular,  depends  upon  preserving  it  within  its  present  limits. 
A  climate,  laws,  manners,  and  language,  different  from  our  own; 
seas,  and  chains  of  mountains  almost  inaccessible,  are  all  so  many 
barriers,  which  we  may  consider  as  fixed  even  by  nature.  Besides, 
what  is  it  that  France  wants !  will  she  not  always  be  the  richest 
-,  and  most  powerful  kingdom  in  Europe?  It  must  be  granted. 
.All  therefore  which  the  French  have  to  wish  or  desire  is  that 
Heaven  grant  them  pious,  good,  and  wise  kings;  and  that  these 
kings  may  employ  their  power  in  preserving  the  peace  of  Europe ; 
for  no  other  enterprise  can  truly  be  to  them  either  profitable  or 

And  this  explains  to  us  the  nature  of  the  design  which 
Henry  IV.  was  on  the  point  of  putting  in  execution  when  it 
pleased  God  to  take  him  to  Himself,  too  soon  by  some  years  for 
the  happiness  of  the  world.  From  hence  likewise  we  may 
perceive  the  motives  of  his  pursuing  a  conduct  so  opposite  to 
any  thing  that  had  hitherto  been  undertaken  by  crowned  heads : 
and  here  we  may  behold  what  it  was  that  acquired  him  the  title 
of  Great.  His  designs  were  not  inspired  by  a  mean  and  despic- 
able ambition,  nor  guided  by  base  and  partial  interests :  to  render 
France  happy  for  ever  was  his  desire,  and  she  cannot  perfectly 
enjoy  this  felicity,  unless  all  Europe  likewise  partake  of  it.  So 

(e)  Cf.  Montesquieu  :  "  Si  une  republique  est  petite,  elle  est  deiruite  par  une 
force  £trangere ;  si  elle  est  grande,  elle  se  detruit  par  une  vice  interieure  " 
(De  I'Esprit  des  Lois,  IX.  1);  Eousseau  :  "  De  deux  etats  qui  nourrissent 
le  meme  nombre  d 'habitants,  celui  qui  occupe  une  moindre  etendue  de  terre  est 
reellement  le  plus  puissant"  (Projet  de  Paix  Perpetuelle) ;  and  Volney  : 
"  Ce  sont  les  grands  e'tats  qui  ont  perdu  les  moeurs  et  la  liberte  des  peuples  " 
(Considerations  sur  la  guerre  actuelle  des  Turcs). 


it  was  the  happiness  of  Europe  in  general  which  he  laboured  to 
procure,  and  this  in  a  manner  so  solid  and  durable,  that  nothing 
should  afterwards  be  able  to  shake  its  foundations. 

I  must  confess  I  am  under  some  apprehensions,  lest  this 
scheme  should  at  first  be  considered  as  one  of  those  chimeras,  or 
idle  political  speculations,  in  which  a  mind  susceptible  of  strange 
and  singular  ideas  may  be  so  easily  engaged.  Those  who  shall 
thus  think  of  it  must  be  that  sort  of  people  on  whom  first 
impressions  have  the  force  of  truth;  or  those,  who  by  their 
distance  from  the  times,  and  their  ignorance  of  the  circumstances, 
confound  the  wisest  and  noblest  enterprises  that  have  ever  been 
formed,  with  those  chimerical  projects  which  princes,  intoxicated 
with  their  power,  have  in  all  ages  amused  themselves  in  forming. 
I  confess,  that  if  we  attentively  examine  the  designs  which  have 
been  planned  from  motives  of  vanity,  confidence  in  good  fortune, 
ignorance,  nay,  from  sloth,  and  even  timidity  itself,  we  must  be 
surprised  at  beholding  sovereigns  plunged  blindly  into  schemes, 
specious  perhaps  in  appearance,  but  which  at  bottom  have  not 
the  least  degree  of  possibility.  The  mind  of  man,  with  so  much 
complacency,  nay,  even  with  so  much  ardour,  pursues  whatever 
it  fancies  great  or  beautiful  that  it  is  sorry  to  realise  that  these 
objects  have  frequently  nothing  real  or  solid  in  them.  But  in 
this,  as  well  as  in  other  things,  there  is  an  opposite  extreme  to  be 
avoided;  namely,  that  as  we  usually  fail  in  the  execution  of 
great  designs,  from  not  commencing  and  continuing  them  with 
sufficient  vigour  and  spirit,  so  likewise  we  are  defective  in  the 
knowledge  of  their  true  worth  and  tendency,  because  we  do  not 
thoroughly  and  properly  consider  them  in  all  their  dependencies 
and  consequences.  I  have  myself  been  more  difficult  to  persuade 
in  this  matter  than  perhaps  any  of  those  who  shall  read  these 
Memoirs,  and  this  I  consider  as  an  effect  of  that  cold,  cautious 
and  unenterprising  temper,  which  makes  so  considerable  a  part 
of  my  character. 

I  remember  the  first  time  the  king  spoke  to  me  of  a  political 
system,  by  which  all  Europe  might  be  regulated  and  governed  as 
one  great  family,  I  scarce  paid  any  attention  to  what  he  said, 
imagining  that  he  meant  no  more  by  it  than  merely  to  divert 
himself,  or  perhaps  to  shew  that  his  thoughts  on  political  subjects 


were  greater  and  penetrated  deeper  than  most  others  :  and  my 
reply  was  a.  mixture  of  pleasantry  and  compliment.  Henry  said 
no  more  at  that  time.  He  often  confessed  to  me  afterwards,  that 
he  had  long  concealed  from  me  what  he  meditated  on  this  subject, 
from  a  sense  of  shame,  which  many  labour  under,  lest  they  should 
disclose  designs  which  might  appear  ridiculous  or  impossible.  I 
was  astonished  when,  some  time  after,  he  renewed  our  conversa- 
tion on  this  head  and  continued  from  year  to  year  to  entertain 
me  with  new  regulations  and  new  improvements  in  this  scheme. 

I  had  been  very  far  from  thinking  seriously  about  it.  If  by 
accident  it  came  into  my  thoughts  for  a  moment,  the  first  view 
of  the  design,  which  conceived  a  re-union  of  all  the  different 
states  of  Europe;  immense  expenses,  at  a  time  when  France 
could  scarce  supply  her  own  necessities;  a  concatenation  of 
events,  which  to  me  appeared  infinite :  these  were  considerations 
which  had  always  made  me  reject  the  thought  as  vain.  I  even 
apprehended  there  was  some  illusion  in  it,  and  I  recollected  some 
of  those  enterprises  in  which  we  had  endeavoured  to  engage 
Europe.  I  considered  those  in  particular  which  had  been  formed 
by  some  of  our  kings,  from  much  less  considerable  motives,  and 
I  felt  myself  disgusted  with  this,  from  the  bad  success  of  all  the 
former.  The  disposition  of  the  princes  of  Europe  to  take  umbrage 
against  France,  when  she  would  have  assisted  them  to  dissipate 
their  fears  from  the  too  great  power  of  Spain,  this  alone  to  me 
appeared  an  unsurmountable  obstacle. 

Strongly  prejudiced  by  this  opinion,  I  used  my  utmost  efforts 
to  undeceive  Henry,  who,  on  his  side,  surprised  not  to  find  me  of 
his  sentiment  in  any  one  point,  immediately  undertook,  and 
readily  succeeded  in  convincing  me  that  my  thus  indiscriminately 
condemning  all  parts  of  his  project,  in  which  he  was  certain  that 
every  thing  at  least  was  not  blameable,  could  proceed  from 
nothing  but  strong  prejudices.  I  could  not  refuse,  at  his  solicita- 
tions, to  use  my  endeavours  to  gain  a  thorough  comprehension 
of  it.  I  formed  a  clearer  plan  of  it  in  my  mind.  I  collected  and 
united  all  its  different  branches.  I  studied  all  its  proportions  and 
dimensions,  if  I  may  say  so,  and  I  discovered  in  them  a  regularity 
and  mutual  dependence,  of  which,  when  I  had  only  considered 
the  design  in  a  confused  and  careless  manner,  I  had  not  been  at 


all  sensible.  The  benefit  which  would  manifestly  arise  from  it  to 
all  Europe  was  what  most  immediately  struck  me,  as  being  in 
effect  the  plainest  and  most  evident;  but  the  means  to  effect  so 
good  a  design  were,  therefore,  what  I  hesitated  at  the  longest. 
The  general  situation  of  the  affairs  of  Europe,  and  of  our  own  in 
particular,  appeared  to  me  every  way  contrary  to  the  realisation 
of  the  project.  I  did  not  consider  that,  since  the  execution  of  the 
scheme  might  be  deferred  till  a  proper  opportunity,  we  could 
prepare  ourselves  with  all  those  resources  which  time  affords  to 
those  who  know  how  to  make  the  best  use  of  it.  I  was  at  last 
convinced,  that  however  disproportionate  the  means  might  appear 
to  the  effect,  a  course  of  years,  during  which  every  thing  should 
as  much  as  possible  be  made  subservient,  to  the  great  object  in 
view,  would  surmount  many  difficulties.  It  is  indeed  somewhat 
extraordinary  that  this  point,  which  appeared  to  be  and  really 
was  the -most  difficult  of  any,  should  at  last  become  the  most 

Having  thus  seen  all  parts  of  the  design  in  their  just  points  of 
view,  having  thoroughly  considered  and  calculated  and  from 
thence  discovered  and  prepared  for  all  events  which  might 
happen,  I  found  myself  confirmed  in  the  opinion,  that  the  design 
of  Henry  the  Great  was,  upon  the  whole,  just  in  its  intention, 
possible  and  even  practicable  in  all  its  parts,  and  infinitely 
glorious  in  all  its  effects.  So  that,  upon  all  occasions,  I  was  the 
first  to  recall  the  king  to  his  engagements,  and  sometimes  to 
convince  him  by  those  very  arguments  which  he  himself  had 
taught  me. 

The  constant  attention  this  prince  paid  to  all  affairs  transacted 
round  him  arising  from  those  singularly  unhappy  circumstances 
by  which,  in  almost  every  instant  of  his  life,  he  found  himself 
embarrassed,  had  been  the  cause  of  his  forming  this  design  even 
from  the  time  when,  being  called  to  the  crown  by  the  death  of 
Henry  III.  he  considered  the  humbling  of  the  house  of  Austria 
as  absolutely  necessary  for  his  security.  Yet,  if  he  was  not 
beholden  to  Elizabeth  for  his  thought  of  the  design,  it  is,  however, 
certain  that  this  great  queen  had  herself  conceived  it  long  before, 
as  a  means  to  avenge  Europe  for  the  attempts  of  its  common 
enemy.  The  troubles  in  which  all  the  following  years  were 


engaged,  the  war  which  succeeded  in  1595,  and  that  against  Savoy 
after  the  peace  of  Vervins,  forced  Henry  into  difficulties  which 
obliged  him  to  lay  aside  all  thoughts  of  other  affairs;  and  it  was 
not  till  after  his  marriage  and  the  firm  re-establishment  of  peace, 
that  he  renewed  his  thoughts  upon  his  first  design,  the  execution 
of  which  appeared  then  more  impossible,  or  at  least  more 
improbable,  than  ever. 

He,  nevertheless,  communicated  it  by  letters  to  Elizabeth,  and 
this  was  what  inspired  them  with  so  strong  an  inclination  to 
confer  together  in  1601  when  this  princess  came  to  Dover  and 
Henry  to  Calais.  What  the  ceremony  of  an  interview  would  not 
have  permitted  them  to  do  I  at  last  begun  by  the  voyage  which 
I  made  to  this  princess.  I  found  her  deeply  engaged  in  the 
means  by  which  this  great  design  might  be  successfully  executed ; 
and,  notwithstanding  the  difficulties  which  she  apprehended  in  its 
two  principal  points,  namely,  the  agreement  of  religions- and  the 
equality  of  the  powers,  she  did  not  to  me  appear  at  all  to  doubt 
of  its  success.  This  she  chiefly  expected,  for  a  reason  of  the 
justness  of  which  I  have  since  been  well  convinced,  namely,  that 
as  the  plan  was  only  contrary  to  the  design  of  some  princes,  whose 
ambitious  views  were  sufficiently  known  to  all  Europe,  this  fact 
would  rather  promote  than  retard  its  success.  She  farther  said, 
that  its  execution  by  any  other  means  than  that  of  arms  would 
be  very  desirable,  as  this  has  always  something  odious  in  it :  but 
she  confessed  that  indeed  it  would  be  hardly  possible  to  begin  it 
otherwise.  A  very  great  number  of  the  articles,  conditions, 
and  different  dispositions  is  due  to  this  queen  and  sufficiently 
shew,  that  in  respect  of  wisdom,  penetration,  and  all  the  other 
perfections  of  the  mind,  she  was  not  inferior  to  any  king  the  most 
truly  deserving  of  that  title. 

~ft  must  indeed  be  considered  as  a  very  great  misfortune  that 

Henry  could  not  at  this  time  second  the  intention  of  the  queen 
of  England,  who  wished  to  have  the  design  put  in  immediate 
execution ;  but  when  he  thus  laid  the  foundation  of  the  edifice 
he  scarcely  hoped  to  see  the  time  when  the  finishing  hand  would 
be  put  to  it.  The  recovery  of  his  own  kingdom  from  the  various 
maladies  by  which  it  was  afflicted  was  a  work  of  several  years ; 
and  unhappily  he  had  himself  seen  forty-eight  when  he  began  it. 


He  pursued  it,  nevertheless,  with  the  greatest  vigour.  The  edict 
of  Nantes  had  been  published  with  this  view  and  every  other 
means  was  used  which  might  gain  the  respect  and  confidence  of 
the  princes  of  Europe.  Henry  and  I,  at  the  same  time,  applied 
ourselves  with  indefatigable  labour  to  regulate  the  interior  affairs 
of  the  kingdom.  We  considered  the  death  of  the  king  of  Spain  (/) 
as  the  most  favourable  event  that  could  happen  to  our  design, 
but  it  received  so  violent  a  shock  by  the  death  of  Elizabeth,  as 
almost  made  us  abandon  all  our  hopes.  Henry  had  no  expecta- 
tion that  the  powers  of  the  North  nor  king  James,  the  successor 
to  Elizabeth,  when  he  was  acquainted  with  his  character,  would 
any  of  them  so  readily  consent  to  support  him  in  his  design,  as 
this  princess  had  done.  However,  the  new  allies  whom  he  daily 
gained  in  Germany  (g),  and  even  in  Italy,  comforted  him  a  little 
for  the  loss  of  Elizabeth.  The  truce  (h)  between  Spain  and  the 
Low  Countries  may  also  be  numbered  among  the  incidents 
favourable  to  it. 

Yet,  if  we  consider  all  the  obstacles  which  afterwards  arose  in 
his  own  kingdom,  from  the  protestants,  the  catholics,  the  clergy, 
nay,  even  from  his  own  council,  it  will  appear  as  if  all  things 
conspired  against  it.  Could  it  be  imagined  that  Henry,  in  his 
whole  council,  should  not  find  one  person  besides  myself  to  whom 
he  could,  without  danger,  disclose  the  whole  of  his  designs?  or 
that  the  respect  due  to  him  could  scarcely  restrain  those 
apparently  most  devoted  to  his  service  from  treating  as  wild  and 
extravagant  chimeras  whatever  of  the  plan  he  had,  with  greatest 
circumspection,  revealed  to  them?  But  nothing  discouraged 
Henry,  who  was  an  able  politician  and  a  better  judge  than  all  his 
council  and  kingdom.  When  he  perceived  that,  notwithstanding 
all  these  obstacles,  affairs  began,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  to 
appear  in  a  favourable  situation,  he  then  considered  the  success 
as  infallible. 

Nor  will  this  his  judgment,  when  thoroughly  considered,  be 
found  so  presumptuous  as  from  a  slight  examination  it  may  to 
some  appear.  For  what  did  he  hereby  require  of  Europe? 

(/)  Philip  II.   of  Spain  died  in  1598. 

(g)  Notably  Maurice  of  Hesse,  the  Elector  Palatine,  the  Duke  of  Wurtem- 
burg,  and  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg. 
(h)  In  1609. 


Nothing  more  than  that  Europe  should  promote  the  means 
whereby  he  proposed  to  stabilise  Christendom  in  that  position 
towards  which  it  had,  by  his  efforts,  been  tending  for  some  time. 
These  means  he  rendered  so  easy  of  execution  that  for  their  fulfil- 
ment there  would  be  required  scarcely  as  much  as  the  princes 
of  Europe  would  voluntarily  sacrifice  for  advantages  less  real, 
certain  or  durable.  What  they  would  gain  by  it,  besides  the 
inestimable  benefits  arising  from  peace,  would  greatly  exceed  all 
the  expenses  they  would  incur.  What  reason  then  could  any  of 
them  have  to  oppose  it?  and,  if  they  did  not  oppose  it,  how  could 
the  house  of  Austria  support  itself  against  powers  who  would  have 
risen  as  open  and  secret  enemies  in  the  hope  of  depriving  it  of 
that  strength  which  it  had  used  only  to  oppress  them?  In  other 
words,  the  house  of  Austria  would  have  to  face  a  united  and 
hostile  Europe.  Nor  would  these  princes  have  any  reason 
jealous  of  the  restorer  cf  their  liberty,  for  he  was  so  far  from 
seeking  to  re-imburse  himself  for  all  the  expenses  which  his 
generosity  would  hereby  involve,  that  his  intention  was  voluntarily 
and  for  ever  to  relinquish  all  power  of  augmenting  his  dominions, 
not  only  by  conquest,  but  by  all  other  just  and  lawful  means. 

By  this  he  would  have  convinced  all  his  neighbours  that 
his  whole  design  was  to  save,  both  himself  and  them,  those 
immense  sums  which  the  maintenance  of  so  many  thousand 
•soldiers,  so  many  fortified  places,  and  so  many  military  expenses 
requires;  to  free  them  for  ever  from  the  fear  of  those  bloody 
catastrophes  so  common  in  Europe;  to  procure  them  an  unin- 
terrupted repose ;  and,  finally,  to  unite  them  all  in  an  indissoluble 
bond  of  security  and  friendship,  after  which  they  might  live 
together  like  brethren,  and  reciprocally  visit  like  good  neighbours 
without  the  trouble  of  ceremony  and  without  the  expense  of  a 
train  of  attendants  which  princes  use  at  best  only  for  ostentation 
and  frequently  to  conceal  their  misery.  Does  it  not  indeed  reflect 
shame  and  reproach  on  a  people  who  affect  to  be  so  polished 
and  refined  in  their  manners  that  all  their  pretended  improve- 
ments have  not  yet  guarded  them  from  these  barbarities  which 
they  detest  in  nations  the  most  savage  and  uncultivated?  To 
destroy  these  pernicious  seeds  of  confusion  and  disorder,  and 
prevent  the  barbarities  of  which  they  are  the  cause,  could  any 


scheme  have  been  more  happily  and  perfectly  contrived  than  that 
of  Henry  the  Great? 

Here  then  is  all  that  could  be  reasonably  expected  or  required. 
It  is  only  in  the  power  of  man  to  prepare  and  act,  success  is  the 
work  of  a  more  mighty  hand.  Sensible  people  cannot  be  blamed 
for  being  prejudiced  in  favour  of  the  scheme  in  question,  from 
this  circumstance  only,  that  it  was  formed  by  the  two  potentates 
whom  posterity  will  always  consider  as  the  most  perfect  models 
of  the  art  of  governing.  In  regard  to,.  Henry  in  particular  I  insist 
that  it  belongs  only  to  princes  who,  like  him,  have  had  a  constant 
succession  of  obstacles  to  encounter  in  all  their  designs.  These 
are  the  princes  who  alone  are  privileged  to  judge  what  are>  real 
obstacles;  and  when  we  behold  them  willing  to  lay  down  their 
lives  in  support  of  their  opinions,  surely  we  may  abide  by  their 
sentiments,  without  fear  of  being  deceived.  For  my  own  part, 
I  shall  always  think  with  regret  that  France,  by  the  blow  which  it 
received  from  the  loss  of  this  great  prince,  was  deprived  of  a  glory 
far  superior  to  that  which  his  reign  had  acquired.  There  remains 
only  to  explain  the  several  parts  of  the  design,  and  the  manner 
in  which  they  were  to  be  executed.  We  will  begin  by  what 
relates  to  religion. 

Two  religions  principally  prevail  in  Christendom,  the  Eoman 
and  the  Eeformed ;  but,  as  this  latter  admits  of  several  variations 
in  its  worship,  which  render  it,  if  not  as  uniform  as  the  roman, 
at  least  as  far  from  being  re-united,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to 
divide  it  in  two,  one  of  which  may  be  called  the  reformed,  and 
the  other  the  protestant  religion  (i).  The  manner  in  which  these 
three  religions  prevail  in  Europe  is  extremely  various.  Italy  and 
Spain  remain  in  possession  of  the  roman  religion,  pure  and 
without  mixture  of  any  other.  The  reformed  religion  subsists  in 
France  with  the  roman,  only  under  favour  of  the  edicts,  and  is 
the  weakest.  England,  Denmark,  Sweden,  the  Low  Countries, 
and  Switzerland,  have  also  a  mixture  of  the  same  kind,  but  with 
this  difference,  that  in  them  the  protestant  is  the  governing 
religion,  the  others  are  only  tolerated.  Germany  unites  all  these 
and  in  several  of  its  circles,  as  well  as  in  Poland,  shews  them 
equal  favour.  I  say  nothing  of  Muscovy  and  Eussia.  These  vast 

(i)  That  is,  the  Calvinist  and  the  Lutheran. 


countries,  which  are  not  less  than  six  hundred  leagues  in  length 
and  four  hundred  in  breadth,  being  in  great  part  still  idolaters, 
and  in  part  schismatics,  such  as  Greeks  and  Armenians,  have 
introduced  so  many  superstitious  practices  in  their  worship, 
that  there  scarce  remains  any  conformity  with  us  among  them; 
besides,  they  belong  to  Asia  at  least  as  much  as  to  Europe. 
We  may  indeed  almost  consider  them  as  a  barbarous  country, 
and  place  them  in  the  same  class  with  Turkey,  though  for  these 
five  hundred  years,  we  have  ranked  them  among  the  Christian 

Each  of  these  three  religions  being  now  established  in  Europe 
in  such  a  manner  that  there  is  not  the  least  appearance  that  any 
of  them  can  be  destroyed  and  experience  having  sufficiently 
demonstrated  the  inutility  and  danger  of  such  an  enterprise,  the 
best  therefore  that  can  be  done,  is  to  preserve,  and  even 
strengthen  all  of  them  in  such  a  manner  that  indulgence  may 
not  become  an  encouragement  to  the  production  of  new  sects  or 
opinions  which  should  carefully  be  suppressed  on  their  first 
appearance.  God  Himself,  by  manifestly  supporting  what  the 
catholics  were  pleased  to  call  the  new  religion,  has  taught  us  this 
conduct  which  is  not  less  conformable  to  the  Holy  Scripture  than 
confirmed  by  its  examples;  and  besides,  the  unsurmountable 
difficulty  of  forcing  the  pope's  authority  where  it  is  no  longer 
acknowledged  renders  what  is  here  proposed  absolutely  necessary. 
Several  cardinals  equally  sagacious  and  zealous  and  even  some 
popes  as  Clement  VIII.  and  Paul  V.  were  of  this  opinion  (/c). 

All  therefore  that  remains  now  to  be  done  is  to  strengthen  the 
nations  who  have  made  choice  of  one  of  these  religions  in  the 
principles  they  profess,  as  there  is  nothing  in  all  respects  so 
•pernicious  as  a  liberty  in  belief;  and  those  nations,  whose 
inhabitants  profess  several  or  all  these  religions  should  be  careful 
to  observe  those  rules  necessary  to  remedy  the  ordinary  incon- 
veniences of  a  toleration  in  other  respects  beneficial.  Italy, 
therefore,  professing  the  roman  religion  and  being  moreover  the 
residence  of  the  popes,  should  preserve  this  religion  in  all  its 
purity,  and  there  would  be  no  hardship  in  obliging  all  its 

(k)  Though  it  was  Clement  VIII.  who  absolved  Henry,  neither  he  nor  his 
successor,  Paul  V.    can  be  credited  with  very  advanced  views  on  toleration. 


inhabitants  either  to  conform  to  it  or  quit  the  country.  The  same 
regulations,  very  nearly,  might  be  observed  in  regard  to  Spain. 
In  such  states  as  that  of  France  where  there  is  at  least  a  govern- 
ing religion,  whoever  should  think  the  regulation  too  severe,  by 
which  calvinism  would  be  always  subordinate  to  the  religion  of 
their  prince,  might  be  permitted  to  depart  the  country.  No  new 
regulations  would  be  necessary  in  any  of  the  other  nations,  no 
violence  on  this  account,  but  liberty  unrestrained,  seeing  this 
liberty  is  become  even  a  fundamental  principle  in  their 
governments  (I). 

Thus  we  may  perceive  every  thing  on  this  head  might  be 
reduced  to  a  few  maxims,  so  much  the  more  certain  and  invari- 
able, as  they  were  not  contrary  to  the  sentiments  of  any  one. 
The  protestants  are  very  far  from  pretending  to  force  their 
religion  upon  any  of  their  neighbours  by  whom  it  is  not  volun- 
tarily embraced.  The  catholics  doubtless  are  of  the  same 
sentiments,  and  the  pope  would  receive  no  injury  in  being 
deprived  of  what  he  confesses  himself  not  to  have  possessed  for 
a  long  time.  His  sacrificing  these  chimerical  rights  would  be 
abundantly  compensated  by  the  regal  dignity  with  which  it  would 
be  proper  to  invest  him  and  by  the  honour  of  being  afterwards  the 
common  mediator  between  all  the  Christian  princes,  a  dignity 
which  he  would  then  enjoy  without  jealousy  and  for  which  it 
must  be  confessed  the  papal  office  has  shown  itself,  by  sagacious 
conduct,  most  peculiarly  fitted. 

Another  point  of  the  political  scheme  which  also  concerns 
religion,  relates  to  the  infidel  princes  of  Europe,  and  consists 
in  forcing  out  of  it  those  who  refuse  to  conform  to  any  of  the 
Christian  doctrines  of  religion.  Should  the  grand  duke  of  Mus- 
covy or  czar  of  Russia,  who  is  believed  to  be  the  ancient  khan 
of  Scythia,  refuse  to  enter  into  the  association  after  it  is  proposed 
to  him,  he  ought  to  be  treated  like  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  deprived 
of  his  possessions  in  Europe,  and  confined  to  Asia  only,  where  he 
might,  as  long  as  he  pleased,  and  without  any  interruption  from 
us,  continue  the  wars  in  which  he  is  almost  constantly  engaged 
against  the  Turks  and  Persians. 

(I)  That  is,  so  long  as  their  rulers  neither  change  their  religion  nor  are 
succeeded  by  rulers  of  a  different  religion.  Sully 's  view  on  toleration  is  simply 
the  orthodox  "  cujus  regio,  eius  religio." 

G.S.  3 


To  succeed  in  the  execution  of  this  plan  will  not  appear  difficult 
if  we  suppose  that  all  the  Christian  princes  unanimously  concurred 
in  it.  It  would  only  be  necessary  for  each  of  them  to  contribute, 
in  proportion  to  their  several  abilities,  towards  the  support  of  the 
forces  and  all  the  other  incidental  expenses  which  the  success  of 
such  an  enterprise  might  require.  These  respective  quotas  were 
to  have  been  determined  by  a  general  council  of  which  we  shall 
speak  hereafter.  The  following  is  what  Henry  the  Great  had 
himself  conceived  on  this  head.  The  pope  for  this  expedition 
should  have  furnished  eight  thousand  foot,  twelve  hundred  horse, 
ten  cannons,  and  ten  galleys;  the  emperor  and  the  circles  of 
Germany,  sixty  thousand  foot,  twenty  thousand  horse,  five  large 
cannons,  and  ten  galleys  or  other  vessels;  the  king  of  France, 
twenty  thousand  foot,  four  thousand  horse,  twenty  cannons,  and 
ten  ships  or  galleys;  Spain,  Britain,  Denmark,  Sweden,  and 
Poland,  the  like  number  with  France,  observing  only,  that  these 
powers  should  together  supply  what  belonged  to  the  sea-service  in 
the  manner  most  suitable  to  their  respective  conveniences  and 
•abilities  therein;  the  king  of  Bohemia,  five  thousand  foot,  fifteen 
hundred  horse,  and  five  cannons;  the  king  of  Hungary,  twelve 
thousand  foot,  five  thousand  horse,  twenty  cannons,  and  six 
ships;  the  duke  of  Savoy,  or  king  of  Lombardy,  eight  thousand 
foot,  fifteen  hundred  horse,  eight  cannons,  and  six  galleys;  the 
republic  of  Venice,  ten  thousand  foot,  twelve  hundred  horse,  ten 
cannons,  and  twenty -five  galleys ;  the  republic  of  the  Swiss 
cantons,  fifteen  thousand  foot,  five  thousand  horse,  and  twelve 
cannons;  the  republic  of  Holland,  twelve  thousand  foot,  twelve 
hundred  horse,  twelve  cannons,  and  twelve  ships;  the  Italian 
republics,  ten  thousand  foot,  twelve  hundred  horse,  ten  cannons, 
and  eight  galleys ;  the  whole  together  amounting  to  about  two 
hundred  and  seventy  thousand  foot,  fifty  thousand  horse,  two 
hundred  cannons,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  ships  or  galleys, 
equipped  and  maintained  at  the  expense  of  those  powers,  each 
contributing  according  to  his  particular  proportion. 

This  armament  of  the  princes  and  states  of  Europe  appears  so 
inconsiderable  and  so  little  burdensome,  when  compared  with  the 
forces  which  they  usually  keep  on  foot  to  awe  their  neighbours, 
or  perhaps  their  own  subjects,  that  were  it  to  have  subsisted, 


even  perpetually,  it  would  not  have  occasioned  any  inconvenience 
and  would  have  been  an  excellent  military  academy.  But  since 
the  enterprises  for  which  it  was  destined,  would  not  always  have 
continued,  the  number  and  expense  might  have  been  diminished 
in  proportion  to  the  necessities  which  would  have  remained  a  con- 
stant factor.  Moreover  I  am  convinced  that  such  an  armament 
would  have  been  so  highly  approved  of  by  all  these  princes  that 
after  they  had,  with  its  help,  conquered  all  those  territories  in 
Europe  (which  they  would  not  willingly  share  with  a  stranger), 
they  would  seek  to  unite  with  these  conquests  such  parts  of  Asia 
as  are  most  commodiously  situated  and  particularly  the  whole 
coast  of  Africa  which  is  too  near  to  our  territories  for  our  complete 
security.  The  only  precaution  to  be  observed  in  regard  to  these 
additional  countries  would  have  been  to  form  them  into  new 
kingdoms,  declare  them  united  with  the  rest  of  the  Christian 
powers,  and  bestow  them  on  different  princes,  carefully  observing 
to  exclude  those  who  before  bore  rank  among  the  sovereigns  of 

That  part  of  the  design  which  may  be  considered  as  purely 
political  turned  almost  entirely  on  a  first  preliminary  which,  I 
think,  would  not  have  met  with  more  difficulty  than  the  preceding 
article.  This  was  to  divest  the  house  of  Austria  of  the  empire 
and  of  all  the  possessions  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Low 
Countries;  in  a  word,  to  reduce  it  to  the  sole  kingdom  of  Spain, 
bounded  by  the  ocean,  the  Mediterranean,  and  the  Pyrenean 
mountains.  But  that  it  might,  nevertheless,  be 'equally  powerful 
with  the  other  sovereignties  of  Europe,  it;^ should  have  Sardinia, 
Majorca,  Minorca;  and,  in  the  other  islands  on  its  own  coasts, 
the  Canaries,  the  Azores,  and  Cape-Verde,  with  its  possessions 
in  Africa,  Mexico  and  the  American  islands  belonging  to  it : 
countries,  which  alone  might  suffice  to  found  great  kingdoms, 
finally,  the  Philippines,  Goa,  the  Moluccas,  and  its  other  posses- 
sions in  Asia. 

From  hence  a  method  seems  to  present  itself  whereby  the  house 
of  Austria  might  be  made  amends  for  what  it  would  be  deprived 
of  in  Europe,  which  is  to  increase  its  dominions  in  the  three  other 
parts  of  the  world  by  assisting  it  to  obtain  and  by  declaring  it  the 
sole  proprietor  both  of  what  we  do  know  and  what  we  may  here- 


after  discover  in  those  parts.  We  may  suppose  that  on  this 
occasion  it  would  not  have  been  necessary  to  use  force  to  bring 
this  house  to  concur  in  such  a  design  and,  indeed,  even  on  this 
supposition  it  was  not  the  prince  of  this  house  reigning  in  Spain, 
to  whom  these  parts  of  the  world  were  to  be  subjected,  but  to 
different  princes,  of  the  same  or  of  different  branches,  who  in 
acknowledgment  of  their  possessions  should  only  have  rendered 
homage  to  the  crown  of  Spain  or,  at  most,  a  tribute  as  due  to 
the  original  conquerors.  This  house,  which  is  so  very  desirous  of 
being  the  most  powerful  in  the  world,  might  hereby  have  con- 
tinued to  natter  itself  with  so  pleasing  a  pre-eminence  without 
the  other  powers  being  endangered  by  its  pretended  grandeur. 

The  steps  taken  by  the  house  of  Austria  to  arrive  at  universal 
monarchy  which  evidently  appear  from  the  whole  conduct  of 
Charles  V.  and  his  son  have  rendered  this  severity  as  just  as  it  is 
necessary  and  I  will  venture  to  say  that  this  house  would  not 
have  had  any  reasonable  cause  to  complain  of  it.  It  is  true  it 
would  be  deprived  of  the  empire;  but  impartially  considered  it 
will  appear  that  all  the  other  princes  of  Germany  and  even  of 
Europe  have  an  equal  right  to  it.  Were  it  necessary  to  prove  this 
we  need  only  recollect  on  what  conditions  Charles  V.  himself,  the 
most  powerful  of  them  all,  was  acknowledged  emperor;  con- 
ditions, which,  at  Smalcalde,  he  solemnly  swore  to  observe,  in 
presence  of  seven  princes  or  electors  and  the  deputies  of  twenty- 
four  protestant  towns,  the  landgrave  of  Hesse  and  the  prince  of 
Anhalt  being  speakers  for  them  all.  He  swore  never  to  act 
contrary  to  the  established  laws  of  the  empire,  particularly  the 
famous  Golden  Bull,  obtained  under  Charles  IV.,  unless  it  were 
to  amplify  them  and  even  that  only  with  the  express  consent  and 
advice  of  the  sovereign  princes  of  Germany;  not  to  infringe  nor 
deprive  them  of  any  of  their  privileges ;  not  to  introduce  foreigners 
into  their  council ;  not  to  make  either  war  or  peace  without  their 
consent;  not  to  bestow  honours  and  employments  but  on  natives 
of  Germany ;  not  to  use  any  other  but  the  German  language  in  all 
writings;  not  to  levy  any  taxes  by  his  own  authority,  nor  apply 
any  conquests  which  might  be  made,  to  his  own  particular  profit. 
He,  in  particular,  formally  renounced  all  pretences  of  hereditary 
right  in  his  house  to  the  imperial  dignity  and  according  to  the 


several  articles  of  the  golden  bull  he  swore  never  in  his  life -time 
to  recognize  a  king  of  the  Romans.  When  the  protestants  of 
Germany,  after  they  had  in  a  manner  driven  Ferdinand  out 
of  it,  consented  to  have  the  imperial  crown  placed  on  his  head, 
they  were  careful  to  make  him  renew  his  engagements  in  regard 
to  all  these  articles  and  to  all  these  new  regulations  relative  to 
the  free  exercise  of  their  religion. 

As  to  the  possessions  of  the  house  of  Austria  in  Germany,  Italy, 
and  the  Low  Countries,  acquired  by  tyrannical  usurpation,  it 
would,  after  all,  be  only  depriving  it  of  territories  which  it  keeps 
at  so  prodigious  an  expense  (I  speak,  in  particular,  of  Italy  and 
the  Low  Countries)  as  all  its  treasures  of  the  Indies  have  not  been 
able  to  defray :  and  besides,  by  investing  it  with  the  exclusive 
privilege  above-mentioned,  of  gaining  new  establishments  and 
appropriating  to  its  own  use  the  mines  and  treasures  of  the  three 
other  parts  of  the  world,  it  would  be  abundantly  indemnified;  for 
these  new  acquisitions  would  be  at  least  as  considerable,  and 
undoubtedly  far  more  rich,  than  those  already  held.  But  what  is 
here  proposed  must  not  be  understood  as  if  the  other  nations  of 
Europe  were  excluded  from  all  commerce  with  those  countries; 
on  the  contrary,  it  should  be  free  and  open  to  every  one  and  the 
house  of  Austria,  instead  of  considering  this  stipulation,  which  is 
of  the  greatest  consequence,  as  an  infringement  of  its  privileges, 
would  rather  have  reason  to  regard  it  as  a  farther  advantage. 

Prom  a  farther  examination  and  consideration  of  these  dis- 
positions I  do  not  doubt  but  the  house  of  Austria  would  have 
accepted  the  proposed  conditions  without  being  forced  to  it;  but, 
supposing  the  contrary,  what  would  a  resistance  have  signified? 
The  promise  made  to  all  the  princes  of  Europe  of  enriching 
themselves  by  the  territories  of  which  this  house  was  to  be 
divested,  would  deprive  it  of  all  hopes  of  assistance  from  any  of 

Upon  the  whole  then  it  appears  that  all  parties  would  have 
been  gainers  by  it  and  this  was  what  assured  Henry  the  Great  of 
the  success  of  his  design.  The  empire  would  again  become  a 
dignity  to  which  all  princes,  but  particularly  those  of  Germany, 
might  aspire.  This  dignity  would  become  so  much  the  more 
desirable  that,  although  in  accordance  with  its  original  institution 


no  revenues  would  be  annexed  to  it,  the  emperor  would  be 
declared  the  first  and  chief  magistrate  of  the  whole  Christian 
republic.  And  as  we  may  suppose  this  honour  would  afterwards 
be  conferred  only  on  the  most  worthy,  all  his  privileges  in  this 
respect,  instead  of  being  diminished,  would  be  enlarged;  his 
authority  over  the  Belgic  and  Helvetic  republics  would  be  more 
considerable  and  upon  every  new  election  they  would  be  obliged 
to  render  him  a  respectful  homage.  The  electors  would  still  con- 
tinue to  enjoy  the  right  of  electing  the  emperor  as  well  as  of 
maintaining  the  king  of  the  Romans ;  with  this  restriction  only, 
that  the  election  should  not  be  made  twice  together  out  of  the 
same  family.  The  first  to  have  been  elected  in  this  manner  was 
the  elector  of  Bavaria  (m),  who  was  also,  in  consequence  of  the 
partition,  to  have  had  those  territories  possessed  by  the  house  of 
Austria  which  joined  to  his  own  on  the  side  of  Italy. 

The  rest  of  these  territories  were  to  have  been  divided  and 
equally  distributed  by  the  kings  of  France,  England,  Denmark, 
and  Sweden  among  the  Venetians  (ri),  the  Grisons  (o),  the  duke 
of  Wurtemburg,  and  the  marquis  of  Baden,  Anspach,  and  Dour- 
lach  (p).  Bohemia  was  to  have  been  constituted  an  elective 
kingdom  by  annexing  to  it  Moravia,  Silesia,  and  Lusatia. 
Hungary  was  also  to  have  been  an  elective  kingdom  and  the  pope, 
the  emperor,  the  kings  of  France,  England,  Denmark,  Sweden, 
and  Lombardy  were  to  have  had  the  right  of  nomination  to  it 
and  because  this  kingdom  may  be  considered  as  the  barrier  of 
Christendom  against  the  infidels,  it  was  to  have  been  rendered 
the  most  powerful  and  able  to  resist  them.  This  was  to  have 
been  done  by  adding  to  it  the  monarchy  of  Austria,  Styria, 
Carinthia,  and  Carniola  and  by  afterwards  incorporating  with  it 

(m)  Of  the  German  princes,  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  was  the  most  consistent 
ally  of  France  at  the  time  when  Sully  was  compiling  his  Memoirs.  On  several 
occasions  he  was  the  French  nominee  for  the  imperial  dignity. 

(n)  Traditionally  at  enmity  with  her  Spanish  and  Italian  neighbours,  the 
policy  of  Venice  constantly  gravitated  to  alliance  with  France.  Moreover,  she 
was  the  one  "  liberal  "  State  in  an  ultramontane  world. 

(o)  The  Grisons  were  Protestants,  and  were  of  paramount  importance  in 
Richelieu's  foreign  policy  because  they  controlled  one  of  the  Alpine  passes  into 

(p)  These  German  princes  were  members  of  the  Evangelical  Union  formed  in 
1608  to  secure  the  religious  integrity  of  their  respective  States,  to  vote  in  the 
Diet  as  one  body,  to  settle  their  own  disputes  by  arbitration,  and  to  maintain 
an  army  for  defence.  Henry  IV.  was  godfather  of  this  league. 


whatever  might  be  acquired  in  Transylvania,  Bosnia,  Sclavonia, 
and  Croatia.  The  same  electors  were  to  have  obliged  themselves, 
by  oath,  to  assist  it  upon  all  occasions  and  they  were  to  have 
been  particularly  careful  never  to  grant  their  suffrages  from 
partiality,  artifice,  or  intrigue  but  always  to  confer  the  dignity 
on  a  prince  who,  by  his  great  qualifications,  particularly  for  war, 
should  be  generally  acknowledged  as  most  proper.  Poland  being, 
from  its  nearness  to  Turkey,  Muscovy,  and  Tartary  in  the  same 
situation  with  Hungary  was  also  to  jbave  been  made  an  elective 
kingdom  by  the  same  eight  potentates ;  and  its  power  was  to  have 
been  augmented  by  annexing  to  it  whatever  should  be  conquered 
from  the  infidels  adjoining  its  own  frontiers  and  by  determining 
in  its  favour  those  disputes  which  it  had  with  all  its  other  neigh- 
bours. Switzerland,  when  augmented  by  Franche-comte",  Alsace, 
Tyrol,  and  other  territories  was  to  have  been  united  into  a 
sovereign  republic  governed  by  a  council  or  senate,  of  which  the 
emperor,  the  princes  of  Germany,  and  the  Venetians  were  to 
have  been  umpires. 

The  changes  to  be  made  in  Italy  were  that  the  pope  should  be  Av 
declared  a  secular  prince  bearing  rank  among  the  monarchs  of 
Europe  and  under  this  title  should  possess  Naples,  Apulia, 
Calabria  and  all  their  dependencies,  which  should  be  indissolubly 
united  to  St.  Peter's  patrimony.  But  in  case  the  holy  father 
had  opposed  this,  which  indeed  could  scarce  have  been  supposed, 
the  disposition  must  then  have  been  changed  and  the  kingdom  of 
Naples  would  have  been  divided  and  disposed  as  the  electoral 
kings  should  have  determined.  Sicily  was  to  have  been  ceded 
to  the  republic  of  Venice,  by  letters  from  the  same  eight  principal 
potentates,  upon  condition  that  it  should  render  homage  for  it 
to  every  pope,  who  should  bear  the  title  of  Immediate  Chief  of 
the  Whole  Italian  republic ;  otherwise  (for  this  reason)  called  The 
republic  of  the  Church.  The  other  members  of  this  republic  were 
to  have  been  Genoa,  Florence,  Mantua,  Modena,  Parma  and 
Lucca,  without  any  alterations  in  their  government.  Bologna 
and  Ferrara  were  to  have  been  rendered  free  cities  and  all  these 
governments  were  every  twenty  years  to  have  rendered  homage 
to  the  pope  their  chief,  by  the  gift  of  a  crucifix  of  the  value  of  ten 
thousand  crowns. 


Of  the  three  great  republics  of  Europe,  it  appears,  upon  the 
first  glance,  that  this  would  have  been  the  most  brilliant  and  the 
richest.  Nevertheless,  it  would  not  have  been  so;  for  what 
belonged  to  the  duke  of  Savoy  was  not  comprised  herein.  His 
territories  were  to  have  been  constituted  one  of  the  greatest 
monarchies  of  Europe,  hereditary  to  males  and  females,  and  to 
have  borne  the  title  of  the  kingdom  of  Lombardy;  wherein, 
beside  the  territory  so  called,  the  Milanese  and  Montserrat  would 
also  have  been  comprised.  The  duke  of  Mantua,  in  exchange 
for  these,  was  to  have  the  duchy  of  Cremona.  An  authentic 
testimony  of  the  institution  would  have  been  given  by  the  pope, 
the  emperor  and  the  other  sovereigns  of  the  Christian  republic. 

Among  all  these  different  dismemberings,  we  may  observe  that 
France  reserved  nothing  for  itself  but  the  glory  of  distributing 
them  with  equity.  Henry  had  declared  this  to  be  his  intention 
long  before.  He  even  sometimes  said,  with  equal  moderation  and 
good  sense,  that  were  these  dispositions  once  firmly  established, 
he  would  have  voluntarily  consented  to  have  the  extent  of  France 
determined  by  a  majority  of  suffrages.  Nevertheless,  as  the 
districts  of  Artois,  Hainault,  Cambresis,  Tournay,  Namur  and 
Luxembourg  might  more  suitably  be  annexed  to  France  than  to 
any  other  nation,  they  were  to  have  been  ceded  to  Henry  but 
divided  into  ten  distinct  governments  and  bestowed  on  so  many 
French  princes  or  lords,  all  of  them  bearing  rank  as  sovereigns  (q). 

In  regard  to  England  it  was  precisely  the  same :  this  was  a 
determined  point  between  Elizabeth  and  Henry,  the  two  princes 
who  were  authors  of  the  scheme.  This  was  probably  due  to 
an  observation  made  by  this  queen,  that  the  Britannic  isles,  in 
all  the  different  states  through  which  they  had  passed,  whether 
under  one  or  several  monarchs,  elective,  hereditary,  masculine  or 
feminine,  and  among  all  the  variations  of  their  laws  and  policy, 
had  never  experienced  any  great  disappointments  or  misfortunes, 
but  when  their  sovereigns  had  meddled  in  affairs  out  of  their  little 
continent.  It  seems,  indeed,  as  if  they  were  concentered  in  it 
even  by  nature,  and  their  happiness  appears  to  depend  entirely 
on  themselves  and  their  having  no  concerns  with  their  neighbours, 

(q)  Compare  this  with  statements  in  second  paragraph  of  p.  46.  Sully  might 
have  removed  this  inconsistency  if  he  himself  had  ever  reduced  the  scheme  to 
a  composite  whole. 


provided  that  they  seek  only  to  maintain  peace  in  the  three 
nations  subject  to  them,  by  governing  each  according  to  its  own 
laws  and  customs.  To  render  every  thing  equal  between  France 
and  England,  Brabant  from  the  dutchy  of  Limbourg,  the  juris- 
diction of  Malines,  and  the  other  dependencies  on  Flemish 
Flanders,  Gallican  or  Imperial,  were  to  have  been  formed  into 
eight  sovereign  fiefs,  to  be  given  to  so  many  princes  or  lords  of 
this  nation. 

These  two  parts  except ed,  all  the  rest  of  the  seventeen  United 
Provinces,  whether  belonging  to  Spain  or  not,  were  to  be  erected 
into  a  free  and  independent  state  under  the  title  of  the  Belgic 
republic ;  though  there  was  one  other  fief  to  be  formed  from  them, 
bearing  the  title  of  a  principality,  to  be  granted  to  the  prince  of 
Orange;  also  some  other  inconsiderable  indemnities  for  three  or 
four  other  persons.  The  succession  of  Cleves  was  to  have  been 
divided  among  those  princes  whom  the  emperor  would  have 
deprived  of  it,  as  well  as  among  some  other  princes  of  the  same 
district,  to  whom  the  imperial  towns  situated  therein  would  have 
been  granted.  Even  Sweden  and  Denmark,  though  they  were  to 
be  considered  as  under  the  influence  of  the  same  law  which 
England  and  France  had  imposed  on  themselves,  would,  by  this 
distribution,  have  enlarged  their  territories  and  acquired  other 
considerable  advantages.  An  end  would  have  been  put  to  the 
perpetual  trouble  which  agitated  these  two  kingdoms  and  this, 
I  think,  would  have  been  rendering  them  no  inconsiderable 
service.  All  these  cessions,  exchanges,  and  transpositions  towards 
the  north  of  Germany  were  to  have  been  determined  by  the  kings 
of  France,  England,  Lombardy,  and  the  republic  of  Venice. 

And  now  perhaps  the  purport  of  the  design  may  be  perceived, 
which  was  to  divide  Europe  equally  among  a  certain  number  of 
powers  and  in  such  a  manner  that  none  of  them  might  have  cause 
either  of  envy  or  fear  from  the  possessions  or  power  of  the  others. 
The  number  of  them  was  reduced  to  fifteen  and  they  were  of 
three  kinds :  six  great  hereditary  monarchies,  five  elective 
monarchies,  and  four  sovereign  republics.  The  six  hereditary 
monarchies  were  France,  Spain,  England  or  Britain,  Denmark, 
Sweden,  and  Lombardy;  the  five  elective  monarchies  were  the 
Empire,  the  Papacy  or  Pontificate,  Poland,  Hungary,  and 


Bohemia;  the  four  republics  were  the  Venetian,  the  Italian,  or 
what,  from  its  dukes,  may  be  called  the  ducal,  the  Swiss, 
Helvetic-  or  Confederate,  and  the  Belgic  or  Provincial  republic. 

The  laws  and  ordinances  proper  to  cement  a  union  between 
all  these  princes  and  to  maintain  that  harmony  which  should  be 
once  established  among  them,  the  reciprocal  oaths  and  engage- 
ments in  regard  both  to  religion  and  policy,  the  mutual  assurances 
in  respect  of  the  freedom  of  commerce  and  the  measures  to  be 
taken  to  make  all  these  partitions  with  equity  and  to  the  general 
content  and  satisfaction  of  the  parties:  all  these  matters  are  to 
be  understood;  nor  is  it  necessary  to  say  any  thing  of  the  pre- 
caution taken  by  Henry  in  regard  to  them.  The. most  that  could 
have  happened  would  have  been  some  trifling  difficulties  which 
would  easily  have  been  obviated  in  the  general  council,  represent- 
ing all  the  states  of  Europe  the  establishment  of  which  was 
certainly  the  happiest  invention  that  could  have  been  conceived 
for  preventing  those  innovations  often  introduced  by  time  into 
the  wisest  and  most  useful  institutions. 

x  The  model  of  this  general  council  of  Europe  had  been  formed 
on  that  of  the  ancient  Arnphictyons  of  Greece,  with  such  altera- 
tions only  as  rendered  it  suitable  to  our  customs,  climate,  and 
policy.  It  consisted  of  a  certain  number  of  commissaries, 
ministers,  or  plenipotentiaries  from  all  the  governments  of  the 
Christian  republic,  who  were  to  be  constantly  assembled  as  a 
senate,  to  deliberate  on  any  affairs  which  might  occur;  to  discuss 
the  different  interests,  pacify  the  quarrels,  clear  up  and  deter- 
mine all  the  civil,  political,  and  religious  affairs  of  Europe, 
whether  within  itself  or  with  its  neighbours.  The  form  and 
manner  of  proceeding  in  the  senate  would  have  been  more  par- 
ticularly determined  by  the  suffrages  of  the  senate  itself.  Henry 
was  of  opinion  that  it  should  be  composed  of  four  commissaries 
from  each  of  the  following  potentates:  The  Emperor,  the  Pope, 
the  kings  of  France,  Spain,  England,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Lom- 
bardy,  Poland,  and  the  republic  of  Venice;  and  of  two  only  from 
the  other  republics  and  inferior  powers,  which  all  together  would 
:  have  composed  a  senate  of  about  sixty-six  persons,  who  should 
have  been  re-chosen  every  three  years. 

In  regard  to  the  place  of  meeting,  it  remained  to  have  been 


determined  whether  it  would  be  better  for  the  council  to  be  fixed 
or  ambulatory,  divided  in  three,  or  united  into  one.  If  it  were 
divided  into  three,  each  containing  twenty-two  magistrates,  then 
each  of  them  must  have  been  fixed  in  such  a  centre  as  should 
appear  to  be  most  commodious,  as  Paris  or  Bourges  for  one,  and 
somewhere  about  Trente  and  Cracovia  for  the  two  others.  If  it 
were  judged  more  expedient  not  to  divide  their  assembly,  whether 
fixed  or  ambulatory,  it  must  have  been  nearly  in  the  centre  of 
Europe  and  would  consequently  have  been  fixed  in  some  one  of 
the  fourteen  cities  following:  Metz,  Luxembourg,  Nancy, 
Cologne,  Mayence,  Troves,  Francfort,  Wurtzbourg,  Heidelberg, 
Spire,  Strasbourg,  Bale,  Bezancon. 

Besides  this  general  council,  it  would  perhaps  have  been 
proper  to  have  constituted  some  others,  of  an  inferior  degree,  for 
the  particular  convenience  of  different  districts.  For  example, 
were  six  such  created,  they  might  have  been  placed  at  Dantzig, 
Nuremberg,  Vienna,  Bologna,  Constance  and  the  last,  wherever 
it  should  be  judged  most  convenient  for  the  kingdoms  of  France, 
Spain,  England  and  the  Belgic  republic.  But  whatever  the 
number  or  form  of  these  particular  councils  might  have  been,  it 
would  have  been  absolutely  necessary  that  they  should  be  sub- 
ordinate, and  recur,  by  appeal,  to  the  great  general  council,  whose 
decisions,  when  considered  as  proceeding  from  the  united  authority 
of  all  the  sovereigns,  pronounced  in  a  manner  equally  free  and 
absolute,  must  have  been  regarded  as  so  many  final  and 
irrevocable  decrees. 

But  let  us  quit  these  speculative  designs,  in  which  practice 
and  experience  would  perhaps  have  caused  many  alterations ;  and 
let  us  come  to  the  means  actually  employed  by  Henry  to  facilitate 
the  execution  of  his  great  design. 

To  gain  one  of  the  most  powerful  princes  of  Europe,  with  whom 
to  concert  all  his  designs,  was  what  Henry  had  always  considered 
as  of  the  utmost  consequence  :  and  this  was  the  reason,  that  after 
the  death  of  Elizabeth,  who  had  indissolubly  united  the  interest 
of  the  two  crowns  of  France  and  England,  every  means  was  used- 
which  might  inspire  her  successor,  king  James,  with  all  her 
sentiments.  Had  I  but  succeeded  in  the  solemn  embassy,  the 
particulars  of  which  I  have  related  already,  so  far  as  to  have 


gained  this  prince's  consent  to  have  his  name  appear  openly  with 
Henry's,  this  military  confederacy,  especially  if  it  had,  in  like 
manner,  been  strengthened  with  the  names  of  the  kings  of 
Denmark  and  Sweden,  would  have  prevented  the  troubles  and 
difficulties  of  many  negotiations:  but  nothing  farther  could  be 
obtained  of  the  king  of  England  than  the  same  promises  which 
were  required  of  the  other  courts ;  namely,  that  he  would  not  only 
not  oppose  the  confederacy,  but,  when  Henry  had  made  his 
designs  public,  would  declare  himself  in  his  favour,  and  contribute 
towards  it  in  the  same  manner  as  the  other  powers  interested 
therein.  A  means  was  indeed  afterwards  found  to  obtain  the 
execution  of  this  promise,  in  a  manner  so  much  the  more  easy 
as  it  did  not  disturb  the  natural  indolence  of  this  prince.  This 
was,  by  getting  what  he  hesitated  to  undertake  in  his  own  name, 
executed  by  his  son,  the  prince  of  Wales,  who,  as  soon  as  he  had 
obtained  his  father's  promise  (that  he  would  at  least  not  obstruct 
his  proceedings),  anticipated  Henry's  utmost  wishes,  being 
animated  with  a  thirst  of  glory,  and  desire  to  render  himself 
worthy  of  the  esteem  and  alliance  of  Henry,  for  he  was  to  marry 
the  eldest  of  the  daughters  of  France.  He  wrote  me  several 
letters  upon  this  subject  and  expressed  himself  in  the  manner  I 
have  mentioned.  He  also  said  that  the  king  of  France  might 
depend  on  having  six  thousand  foot  and  fifteen  hundred  horse, 
which  he  would  undertake  to  bring  into  his  service  whenever  they 
should  be  required :  and  this  number  was  afterwards  augmented 
by  two  thousand  more  foot,  and  eight  cannons,  maintained  in  all 
respects  at  the  expense  of  England  for  three  years  at  least.  The 
king  of  Sweden  did  not  shew  himself  less  zealous  for  the  common 
cause ;  and  the  king  of  Denmark  also  appeared  to  be  equally  well 
disposed  in  its  favour. 

In  the  mean  time  we  were  indefatigable  in  our  negotiations  in 
the  different  courts  of  Europe,  particularly  in  the  circles  of 
Germany  and  the  United  Provinces,  where  the  king,  for  this 
purpose,  had  sent  Boisisse,  Fresne-Canaye,  Baugy,  Ancel,  and 
Bongars.  The  council  of  the  States  were  very  soon  unanimous  in 
their  determinations :  the  prince  of  Orange  sent  the  sieurs 
Malderet  and  Brederode  from  them  to  offer  the  king  fifteen 
thousand  foot  and  three  thousand  horse.  They  were  soon  followed 


by  the  landgrave  of  Hesse,  and  the  prince  of  Anhalt,  to  whom  as 
well  as  to  the  prince  of  Orange,  the  confederacy  was  obliged  for 
being  increased  by  the  duke  of  Savoy;  by  all  of  the  reformed 
religion  in  Hungary,  Bohemia,  and  lower  Austria;  by  many 
protestant  princes  and  towns  in  Germany;  and  by  all  the  Swiss 
Cantons  of  this  religion.  And  when  the  succession  of  Cleves, 
which  the  Emperor  shewed  himself  disposed  to  usurp,  became 
another  incentive  to  the  confederacy,  there  was  then  scarce  any 
part  of  Germany  that  was  not  for  us;  which  evidently  appeared 
from  the  result  of  the  general  assembly  at  Hall  (r).  The  elector 
of  Saxony,  who  perhaps  remained  alone  of  the  opposite  party, 
might  have  been  embarrassed  in  an  affair  out  of  which  he  would 
probably  have  found  it  difficult  to  extricate  himself ;  and  this  was 
to  have  been  done  by  recalling  to  his  memory  the  fate  of  the 
branch  of  John  Frederic,  deprived  of  this  electorate  by 
Charles  V.  (s). 

There  were  several  of  these  powers,  in  regard  to  whom  I  am 
persuaded  nothing  would  have  been  risked,  by  disclosing  to  them 
the  whole  intent  and  scope  of  the  design.  On  the  contrary,  they 
would  probably  have  seconded  it  with  the  greater  ardour  when 
they  found  the  destruction  of  Austrian  grandeur  was  a  determined 
point.  These  powers  were  more  particularly  the  Venetians,  the 
United  Provinces,  almost  all  the  protestant  s,  and  especially  the 
evangelics  of  Germany.  But  as  too  many  precautions  could  not 
be  taken  to  prevent  the  catholic  powers  from  being  prejudiced 
against  the  new  alliance  in  which  they  were  to  be  engaged,  a  too 
hasty  discovery,  either  of  the  true  motives,  or  the  whole  intent 
of  the  design,  was  therefore  cautiously  avoided.  It  was  at  first 
concealed  from  all  without  exception  and  afterwards  revealed  but 
to  a  few  persons  of  approved  discretion  and  those  only  such  as 
were  absolutely  necessary  to  engage  others  to  join  the  confederacy. 
The  association  was  for  a  long  time  spoken  of  to  others  only  as  a 
kind  of  general  treaty  of  peace,  wherein  such  methods  would  be 

(r)  By  the  Treaty  of  Hall  (1610),  Henry  IV.  and  the  Evangelical  Union 
agreed  to  support  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg  and  Count  Philip  of  Neuburg  in 
their  claims  to  the  Cleves-Julich  territories. 

(s}  Presumably  a  threat.  After  the  victory  of  Charles  V.  over  the  Protest- 
ants at  Muhlberg  (1547),  the  electorate  of  Saxony  was  transferred  from  the 
elder  (Ernestine)  to  the  younger  (Albertine)  branch  of  the  family.  There 
would  therefore  be  good  precedent  for  depriving  the  Elector  should  he  refuse 
to  conform. 


projected  as  the  public  benefit  and  the  general  service  of  Europe 
might  suggest  as  necessary  to  stop  the  progress  of  the  excessive 
power  of  the  house  of  Austria.  Our  ambassadors  and  agents  had 
orders  only  to  demand  of  these  princes  a  renewal  or  commence- 
ment of  alliance,  in  order  more  effectually  to  succeed  in  the  pro- 
jected peace;  to  consult  with  them  upon  the  means  whereby  to 
effect  it ;  to  appear  as  if  sent  only  for  the  purpose  of  joint  enquiry 
into  the  discovery  of  these  means.  According  to  the  disposition 
in  which  they  found  these  princes,  they  were  to  insinuate,  as  if 
by  accidental  conjecture,  some  notion  of  a  new  method  for  main- 
taining the  equilibrium  of  Europe  and  for  securing  to  each  religion 
a  more  undisturbed  peace  than  it  had  hitherto  enjoyed.  The 
proposals  made  to  the  kings  of  England  and  Sweden,  and  the 
dukes  of  Savoy  and  Lorraine,  for  alliances  by  marriage,  proved 
very  successful :  it  was  absolutely  determined  that  the  dauphin 
should  espouse  the  heiress  of  Lorraine,  which  dutchy  still  con- 
tinued, as  before,  to  depend  on  the  Empire. 

But  no  precaution  appeared  so  necessary,  nor  was  more 
strongly  recommended  to  our  negotiators,  than  to  convince  all 
the  princes  of  Europe  of  the  disinterestedness  with  which  Henry 
was  resolved  to  act  on  this  occasion.  This  point  was  indefatigably 
laboured,  and  they  were  convinced  of  it,  when,  on  the  supposition 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  arms,  we  strongly 
affirmed  that  the  forces,  the  treasures,  and  even  the  person  of 
Henry,  might  be  depended  on ;  and  this  in  a  manner  so  generous 
on  his  side,  that,  instead  of  expecting  to  be  rewarded,  or  even 
indemnified  for  them,  he  was  voluntarily  inclined  to  give  the  most 
positive  assurances,  not  to  reserve  to  himself  a  single  town,  nor 
the  smallest  district.  This  moderation,  of  which  at  last  no  one 
doubted,  made  a  suitable  impression,  especially  when  it  was 
perceived  to  be  so  much  the  more  generous,  as  there  was  sufficient 
to  excite  and  satisfy  the  desires  of  all.  And  in  the  interim, 
before  the  solemn  publication  of  this  absolute  renunciation,  which 
was  to  have  been  made  in  the  manifestoes  that  were  preparing, 
Henry  gave  a  proof  of  it,  in  the  form  of  an  absolute  demonstration 
to  the  pope  (t). 

No  one  being  ignorant  that  as  it  was,   at  least,   intended  to 

(t)  Compare  this  with  p.   40. 

MEMOIRS  OF  THE  DUKE  OF  SULLY.      ..         47 

deprive  Spain  of  those  of  its  usurpations  which  were  the  most 
manifestly  unjust  (Navarre  and  Eousillon  would  infallibly  revert 
to  France),  the  king  therefore  voluntarily  offered  to  exchange 
them  for  the  two  kingdoms  of  Naples  and  Sicily  and  at  the  same 
time  to  make  a  present  of  both  to  the  Pope  and  the  republic  of 
Venice.  This,  certainly,  was  renouncing  the  most  incotitestible 
right  he  could  have  to  any  of  the  territories  of  which  this  Crown 
was  to  be  deprived;  and  by  submitting  this  affair,  as  he  did,  to 
the  determination  of  the  Pope  and  the  Venetians,  he  the  more 
obviously  obliged  them,  as  both  the  honour  and  profit  which  might 
arise  therefrom  would  be  in  their  favour.  The  Pope,  therefore, 
on  the  first  proposition  made  to  him,  even  anticipated  Henry's 
intentions.  He  immediately  demanded  whether,  as  affairs  were 
then  circumstanced,  the  several  powers  would  approve  his 
taking  upon  him  the  office  of  common  mediator,  to  establish 
peace  in  Europe  and  convert  the  continual  wars  among  its  several 
princes  into  a  perpetual  war  against  the  infidels.  This  was  a  part 
of  the  design  he  had  been  very  careful  to  acquaint  him  with : 
and  the  pope  sufficiently  shewed  that  he  was  desirous  nothing 
should  be  done  without  his  participation  and  that  he  was  still  less 
disposed  to  refuse  the  advantage  offered  to  him. 

Paul  V.  when  a  favourable  opportunity  offered,  explained 
himself  more  openly  on  this  head.  Ubaldini,  his  nuncio,  told 
the  king  that  his  holiness,  for  the  confederacy  against  the  house 
of  Austria,  would,  on  various  pretences,  engage  to  raise  ten 
thousand  foot,  fifteen  hundred  horse,  and  ten  cannons;  provided 
that  his  majesty  would  promise  to  defray  the  necessary  expenses 
of  their  subsistence  for  three  years;  would  give  all  possible 
security  for  the  cession  of  Naples,  and  the  other  rights  of  homage, 
•according  to  promise;  and  would  sincerely  consent  to  the  other 
conditions,  in  regard  to  the  treaty  that  he  should  think  necessary 
to  impose.  These  conditions,  at  least  the  principal  of  them,  were, 
that  only  catholics  should  be  elected  emperors;  that  the  Eoman 
religion  should  be  maintained  in  all  its  rights,  and  ecclesiastics 
in  all  their  privileges  and  immunities;  and  that  the  protestants 
should  not  be  permitted  to  establish  themselves  in  places  where 
they  were  not  established  before  the  treaty.  The  king  promised 
Ubaldini  that  he  would  religiously  observe  all  these  conditioiis 


and  farther,  he  relinquished  to  the  pope  the  honour  of  being  the 
arbitrator  of  all  those  regulations  to  be  made  in  the  establishment 
of  the  new  republic. 

The  removing  of  these  difficulties  in  regard  to  the  pope  was  of 
no  inconsiderable  consequence  for  his  example  would  not  fail  to 
be  of  great  force  in  determining  the  other  catholic  powers, 
especially  those  of  Italy.  Nothing  was  neglected  which  might 
promote  the  favourable  dispositions  in  which  they  appeared  to  be, 
by  punctually  paying  the  cardinals  and  petty  princes  of  Italy 
their  pensions,  and  even  by  adding  to  them  several  other 
gratuities.  The  establishment  of  a  new  monarchy  in  Italy  was 
the  only  pretence  these  petty  courts  had  for  not  joining  in  the  con- 
federacy; but  this  vain  apprehension  would  be  easily  dissipated. 
The  particular  advantages  which  each  would  acquire  might  alone 
have  satisfied  them  in  this  respect;  but  if  not,  all  opposers  might 
have  been  threatened  with  being  declared,  after  a  certain  time, 
divested  of  all  right  to  the  proposed  advantages  and  even  of  all 
pretensions  to  the  empire,  or  the  elective  kingdoms ;  and  that  the 
republics  amongst  them  should  be  converted  into  sovereignties, 
and  sovereignties  into  republics.  There  is  but  little  probability 
that  any  of  them  would  even  have  demurred  what  to  do.  The 
punishment  of  the  first  offender  would  have  compelled  the  sub- 
mission of  all  these  petty  states,  who  were  besides  sufficiently 
sensible  of  their  impotence.  But  this  method  was  not  to  be  used 
but  on  failure  of  all  others;  and  even  then,  no  opportunity 
would  have  been  neglected  of  shewing  them  favour. 

And  now  we  are  arrived  at  the  point  to  which  every  thing  was 
advanced  at  the  fatal  moment  of  the  death  of  Henry  the  Great; 
and  the  following  is  a  circumstantial  detail  of  the  forces  for  the 
war  (u),  which  all  the  parties  concerned  had,  in  conjunction  with 
him,  agreed  to  furnish.  The  contingents  of  the  kings  of  England, 
Sweden,  and  Denmark  were  each  eight  thousand  foot,  fifteen 
hundred  horse,  and  eight  cannons,  to  be  raised  and  maintained, 
in  all  respects,  at  their  expense,  at  least  for  three  years;  and  this 
expense,  reckoning  ten  livres  a  month  for  each  foot  soldier,  thirty 
livres  for  each  trooper,  the  pay  of  the  officers  included,  and  the 
year  to  be  composed  of  ten  months,  would  amount,  for  each  of 


(u)     Compare  these  figures  with  those  already  given  on  p.  34. 


these  states,  to  three  millions  three  hundred  and  seventy  thousand 
livres  for  three  years ;  the  expense  of  the  artillery,  fifteen  hundred 
livres  a  month  for  each  piece  being  also  included.  The  princes 
of  Germany,  before  mentioned,  were  to  furnish  twenty-five 
thousand  foot,  ten  thousand  horse,  and  forty  cannons:  they  had 
themselves  computed  the  expense  at  nine  or  ten  millions  for  three 
years.  The  United  Provinces,  twelve  thousand  foot,  two 
thousand  horse,  and  ten  cannons  :  the  expense  twelve  millions. 
Hungary,  Bohemia,  and  the  other  evangelics  of  Germany,  the 
same  number,  and  nearly  at  the  same  expense.  The  Pope,  ten 
thousand  foot,  fifteen  hundred  horse,  and  eight  cannons.  The 
duke  of  Savoy,  eighteen  thousand  foot,  two  thousand  horse,  and 
twelve  cannons.  The  Venetians,  twelve  thousand  foot,  two 
thousand  horse,  and  twelve  cannons.  The  expense  of  these  last 
mentioned  armaments  the  king  himself  had  engaged  to  defray. 
The  total  of  all  these  foreign  forces,  allowing  for  deficiencies, 
which  might  probably  have  happened,  would  always  have  been, 
at  least  one  hundred  thousand  foot,  from  twenty  to  twenty-five 
thousand  horse  and  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  cannons. 

The  king,  on  his  side,  had  actually  on  foot  two  good  and  well 
furnished  armies;  the  first,  which  he  was  to  have  commanded  in 
person,  consisted  of  twenty  thousand  foot,  all  native  French, 
eight  thousand  Switzers,  four  thousand  Lansquenets  or  Walloons, 
five  thousand  horse,  and  twenty  cannons.  The  second,  to  be 
commanded  by  Lesdiguieres,  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Alps, 
consisted  of  ten  thousand  foot,  one  thousand  horse,  and  ten 
cannons ;  besides  a  flying  camp,  of  four  thousand  foot,  six  hundred 
horse,  and  ten  cannons;  and  a  reserve  of  two  thousand  foot  to 
garrison  such  places  where  they  might  be  necessary.  We  will 
make  a  general  calculation  of  all  these  troops. 

The  twenty  thousand  foot,  at  twenty-one  livres  a  month  to  each 
man,  including  the  appointments  of  generals  and  officers,  would, 
by  the  month,  require  four  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  livres, 
and  by  the  year,  five  millions  and  forty  thousand  livres ;  the  eight 
thousand  Switzers  and  four  thousand  Lasquenets,  three  millions ; 
the  five  thousand  horse,  at  sixty  livres  a  month  to  each,  by  the 
month,  would  require  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  livres,  and 
by  the  year,  two  millions  eight  hundred  and  forty  thousand  livres. 

G.S.  4 


This  computation  is  made  so  high  as  sixty  livres  a  month  to  each, 
because  the  pay  of  the  officers,  and  particularly  of  the  king's 
body-guard,  composed  of  a  thousand  men  of  the  first  rank  in  the 
kingdom,  who  served  as  volunteers,  was  therein  included.  The 
expense  of  the  twenty  large  cannons,  six  culverins,  and  four  demi- 
culverins,  supposing  all  necessary  furniture  for  them  provided, 
would  amount  to  three  thousand  six  hundred  livres  a  month  for 
each  piece ;  the  thirty  together  would  consequently  require  one 
hundred  and  eight  thousand  livres.  Extraordinary  expenses  and 
losses,  in  regard  to  the  provisions  and  ammunition  for  his  anny. 
might  be  computed  at  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  livres. 

And  for  expenses,  whether  ordinary  or  extraordinary,  in  spies, 
for  sick  and  wounded,  and  other  unforeseen  contingencies,  com- 
puting at  the  highest,  a  like  sum  of  one  million  eight  hundred 
thousand  livres.  To  supply  the  deficiencies  which  might  happen 
in  the  armies  of  the  confederate  princes,  to  pay  the  pensions,  and 
to  answer  other  particular  exigencies  which  might  arise  in  the 
kingdom,  three  hundred  thousand  livres  a  month;  for  the  year, 
three  millions  six  hundred  thousand  livres.  The  army  of  Les- 
diguieres  would  require  three  millions  a  year;  and  as  much  for 
each  of  the  armies  of  the  Pope,  the  Venetians,  and  the  duke  of 
Savoy.  These  four  last  articles  together,  make  twelve  millions 
a  year;  which,  added  to  the  preceding  sums  amount  in  the  whole 
to  about  thirty  millions  one  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  livres  a 

It  remains  only  to  triple  this  total  for  three  years,  during  which 
it  was  supposed  there  might  be  occasion  for  the  forces,  and  the 
whole  amount  will  appear  to  be  between  ninety  and  ninety-one 
millions,  which  might  perhaps  be  necessary  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  the  intended  war.  I  say  perhaps,  for  in  this  calculation  I  have 
not  included  the  ftying  camp,  nor  the  two  thousand  men  for 
garrisons  :  the  first  of  these  two,  at  the  rate  of  eighteen  livres  a 
month  to  each  foot  soldier,  and  fifty  livres  to  each  trooper,  would 
require  a  farther  sum  of  about  one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand 
livres  a  month ;  which,  for  a  year,  would  be  one  million  five 
hundred  thousand  livres.  and  four  millions  five  hundred  thousand 
livres  for  three  years :  the  second  for  the  three  years,  would 
require  about  twelve  hundred  thousand  livres. 


On  a  supposition  that  the  expense  of  France,  on  this  occasion, 
would  not  have  amounted  to  more  than  between  ninety  and 
ninety-five  millions  (which  supposition  is  far  from  being  hazard- 
ous, because  we  have  here  computed  every  thing  at  the  highest  it 
would  bear),  it  is  easy  to  shew  that,  at  the  expiration  of  three 
years,  Henry  would  have  remaining  in  his  coffers  thirty  millions 
over  and  above  what  would  be  expended,  the  total  amount  of  all 
the  receipts  from  the  several  funds,  formed  and  to  be  formed  for 
these  three  years,  being  one  hundred  "and  twenty-one  millions  five 
hundred  and  forty  thousand  livres,  as  appears  from  the  three 
estimates  which  I  drew  up  and  presented  to  his  majesty. 

The  first  of  these  estimates,  which  contained  only  a  list  of  the 
sums  actually  deposited  in  the  Bastile,  amounted  to  twenty-two 
millions  four  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  livres,  in  several  coffers, 
marked  Phelipeaux,  Puget,  and  Bouhier.  The  second  was 
another  list  of  the  sums  actually  due  from  the  farmers  (v),  par- 
tisans, and  receivers-general  which  might  be  considered  as  in 
possession,  and  produced  another  total  of  eighteen  millions  six 
hundred  and  thirteen  thousand  livres.  These  two  totals  together 
made  forty-one  millions  seventy-three  thousand  livres  which  the 
king  would  immediately  have  at  his  disposal.  To  acquire  the  rest 
of  these  hundred  and  twenty-one  millions,  I  had  no  recourse,  in 
the  third  estimate,  to  any  new  taxations.  The  whole  remainder 
would  arise  solely  from  the  offers  of  augmentation  upon  the 
several  royal  revenues  which  the  farmers  and  partisans  (w)  had 
made  for  a  lease  of  three  years,  and  from  what  the  officers  of 
justice  and  the  finances  had  voluntarily  engaged  to  furnish, 
provided  they  might  be  permitted  the  free  enjoyment  of  certain 
privileges :  so  that  in  these  one  hundred  twenty-one  millions,  I 
had  not  comprehended  the  three  years  receipts  of  the  other  royal 
revenues.  And  in  case  it  were  afterwards  necessary  to  have 
recourse  to  means  somewhat  more  burthensorne,  I  had  given  the 
king  another  estimate,  whereby,  instead  of  these  one  hundred  and 

(v)  That  is,  the  tax-farmers. 

(w)  The  "  partisans  "  were  a  hated  class  who,  when  ready  money  was  short, 
would  advance  a  portion  ("parti")  of  the  expected  total  yield  of  a  tax  and 
then  recoup  themselves  by  extracting  the  full  amount  of  the  tax  from  those  on 
whom  it  was  levied.  Although  Sully,  as  Superintendent  of  Finance,  effected 
several  reforms,  he  was  never  able  to  eradicate  the  vicious  system  by  which,  in 
flic  absence  of  a  civil  service,  the  taxes  were  battened  upon  by  a  host  of  human 


twenty-one  millions,  it  appeared  that  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
millions  might  have  been  raised.  I  also  demonstrated,  that,  upon 
any  pressing  emergency,  this  kingdom  could  open  itself  resources 
of  treasure  that  are  almost  innumerable. 

It  was  very  much  to  be  wished  that  the  sums  of  money  and  the 
number  of  men  to  be  furnished  by  the  other  confederates  would 
be  equally  well  secured  by  such  estimates.  But  whatever 
deficiencies  might  have  happened,  having  forty-one  millions  to 
distribute  wherever  it  might  be  found  necessary,  what  obstacles 
could  Henry  have  to  fear  from  a  power  which  was  known  to  be 
destitute  of  money,  and  even  of  troops?  no  one  being  ignorant, 
that  the  best  and  most  numerous  forces  which  Spain  had  in  its 
service  were  drawn  from  Sicily,  Naples,  and  Lombardy  or  else 
were  Germans,  Switzers,  and  Walloons. 

Every  thing  therefore  concurring  to  promote  success,  and  good 
magazines  being  placed  in  proper  parts  of  the  passage,  the  king 
was  on  the  point  of  marching,  at  the  head  of  his  army,  directly 
to  Mezieres;  from  whence,  taking  his  route  by  Clinchamp, 
Orchimont,  Beauraing,  Offais,  Longpre,  &c.  after  having  caused 
five  forts  to  be  erected  in  these  quarters,  and  therein  placed  his 
two  thousand  men  destined  for  that  purpose,  with  the  necessary 
provisions 'and  ammunition,  he  would,  near  Duren  and  Stavelo, 
have  joined  the  two  armies,  which  the  princes  of  Germany  and 
the  United  Provinces  would  have  caused  to  inarch  thither.  There- 
upon beginning  by  occupying  all  those  passages  through  which  the 
enemy  might  find  entrance  into  the  territories  of  Juliers  and 
Cleves.  these  principalities,  which  were  a  pretext  for  the 
armament,  would  consequently  have  immediately  submitted  to 
him  and  would  have  been  sequestrated,  till  it  should  appear  how 
the  Emperor  and  the  king  of  Spain  would  act  in  regard  to  the 
designs  of  the  confederate  princes. 

This  was  the  moment  fixed  on  to  publish  and  make  known 
throughout  Europe,  the  declarations,  in  form  of  manifestoes, 
which  were  to  open  the  eyes  of  all  in  regard  to  their  true  interests 
and  the  real  motives  which  had  caused  Henry  and  the  confederate 
princes  thus  to  take  up  arms.  These  manifestoes  were  composed 
with  the  greatest  care;  a  spirit  of  justice,  honesty,  and  good  faith, 
of  disinterestedness  and  good  policy,  were  every  where  apparent 


in  them.  Without  wholly  revealing  the  several  changes  intended 
to  be  made  in  Europe,  it  was  intimated  that  their  common 
interest  had  thus  compelled  its  princes  to  arm  themselves ;  not 
only  to  prevent  the  house  of  Austria  from  getting  possession  of 
Cleves,  but  also  to  divest  her  of  the  United  Provinces,  and  of 
whatever  else  she  unjustly  possessed ;  that  their  intentions  were 
to  distribute  these  territories  among  such  princes  and  states  as 
were  the  weakest ;  that  the  design  was  such,  as  could  not  surely 
give  occasion  to  a  war  in  Europe  ;  thai;,  though  armed,  the  kings  of 
France  and  the  North  rather  chose  to  be  mediators  in  the  causes 
of  complaint  which  Europe,  through  them,  made  against  the  house 
of  Austria,  and  only  fought  amicably  to  determine  all  differences 
subsisting  among  the  several  princes ;  and  that  whatever  was 
done  on  this  occasion  should  be  not  only  with  the  unanimous 
consent  of  all  these  powers,  but  even  of  all  their  people,  who 
were  hereby  invited  to  give  in  their  opinions  to  the  confederate 
princes.  Such  also  would  have  been  the  substance  of  the  circular 
letters  which  Henry  and  the  associated  princes  would  at  the  same 
time  send  to  all  places  subject  to  them ;  that  so  the  people 
being  informed,  and  joining  their  suffrages,  a  universal  cry  from 
all  parts  of  Christendom  would  have  been  raised  against  the  house 
of  Austria. 

As  it  was  determined  to  avoid,  with  the  utmost  caution,  what- 
ever might  give  umbrage  to  any  one,  and  Henry  being  desirous 
to  give  still  more  convincing  proofs  to  his  confederates  that  to 
promote  their  true  interests  was  his  sole  study  and  design;  to 
these  letters  already  mentioned  he  would  have  added  others  to 
be  written  to  different  courts,  particularly  to  the  electors  of 
Cologne  and  Treves,  the  bishops  of  Munster,  Liege,  and  Paderborn 
and  the  duke  and  duchess  of  Lorraine.  This  conduct  would  have 
been  pursued  in  regard  even  to  our  enemies,  in  the  letters  which 
were  to  be  written  to  the  archduke,  and  the  infanta  his  wife,  to 
the  Emperor  himself,  and  to  all  the  Austrian  princes,  requesting 
them,  from  the  strongest  and  most  pressing  motives,  to  embrace 
the  only  right  and  reasonable  party.  In  all  places,  nothing  would 
have  been  neglected,  to  instruct,  convince,  and  gain  confidence; 
the  execution  of  all  engagements,  and  the  distribution  or  seques- 
tration of  whatever  territories  might  require  to  be  so  disposed 


would  have  been  strictly,  and  even  scrupulously,  observed;  force 
would  never  have  been  employed,  till  arguments,  entreaties, 
embassies,  and  negotiations  should  have  failed;  finally,  even  in 
the  use  of  arms,  it  would  have  been  not  as  enemies,  but  pacifiers. 
The  queen  would  have  advanced  as  far  as  Metz,  accompanied  by 
the  whole  court,  and  attended  by  such  pomp  and  equipage  as  were 
suitable  only  to  peace. 

Henry  had  projected  a  new  method  of  discipline  in  his  camp, 
which  very  probably  would  have  produced  the  good  effects 
intended  by  it,  especially  if  his  example  had  been  imitated  by  the 
other  princes  his  allies.  He  intended  to  have  created  four 
marshals  of  France,  or  at  least  four  camp  marshals,  whose  sole 
care  should  have  been  to  maintain  universal  order,  discipline,  and 
subordination.  The  first  of  these  would  have  had  the  inspection 
of  the  cavalry,  the  second  of  the  French  infantry,  the  third  of  the 
foreign  forces,  and  the  fourth  of  whatever  concerned  the  artillery, 
ammunition,  and  provisions  and  the  king  would  have  required  an 
exact  and  regular  account  from  these  officers  of  whatever  was 
transacted  by  them  in  their  respective  divisions.  He  applied 
himself  with  equal  ardour  to  make  all  military  virtues  revered  arid 
honoured  in  his  army  by  granting  all  employs  and  places  of  trust 
to  merit  only,  by  preferring  good  officers,  by  rewarding  good 
soldiers,  by  punishing  blasphemies  and  other  impious  language, 
by  shewing  a  regard  both  for  his  own  troops  and  those  of  his 
confederates,  by  stifling  a  spirit  of  discord,  caused  by  a  difference 
or  religions  and,  finally,  by  uniting  emulation  with  that  harmony 
of  sentiments  which  contributes  more  than  all  the  rest  to  obtain 

The  consequence  of  this  enterprise,  with  regard  to  war,  would 
have  depended  on  the  manner  in  which  the  Emperor  and  the 
king  of  Spain  would  receive  the  propositions  and  their  reply  to  the 
manifestoes  of  the  confederate  princes.  It  seems  probable  that 
the  emperor,  submitting  to  force,  would  have  consented  to  every 
thing.  I  am  even  persuaded  he  would  have  been  the  first  to 
demand  an  amicable  interview  with  the  king  of  France,  that  he 
might  at  least  extricate  himself  with  honour  out  of  the  difficulties 
in  which  he  would  have  been  involved  and  he  would  probably 
have  been  satisfied  with  assurances  that  the  imperial  dignity,  with 


all  its  rights  and  prerogatives,  should  be  secured  to  him  for  his 
life.  The  archdukes  had  made  great  advances;  they  engaged  to 
permit  the  king,  with  all  his  troops,  to  enter  their  territories  and 
towns,  provided  they  committed  no  hostilities  in  them  and  paid 
punctually,  in  all  places,  for  whatever  they  required.  If  these 
appearances  were  not  deceitful,  Spain  being  abandoned  by  all, 
must,  though  unwillingly,  have  submitted  to  the  will  of  its  con- 

But  it  may  be  supposed,  that  all  the  branches  of  the  house  of 
Austria  would,  on  this  occasion,  have  united,  and,  in  defence  of 
their  common  interests,  would  have  used  all  the  efforts  of  which 
they  were  capable.  In  this  case,  Henry  and  the  confederate 
princes  would  declare  war  in  form  against  their  enemies  and 
deprived  the  Spaniards  of  all  communications,  especially  with 
the  Low  Countries  after  having,  as  we  have  said,  united  all  their 
forces,  given  audience  to  the  princes  of  Germany,  promised  assist- 
ance to  the  people  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia  who  should  come  to 
implore  it  of  them,  and  finally,  secured  the  territory  of  Cleves. 
These  princes  would  then  have  caused  their  three  armies  to 
advance  towards  Bale  and  Strasbourg  to  support  the  Switzers, 
who  after  having,  for  form's  sake,  asked  leave  of  the  emperor, 
would  have  declared  for  the  union.  The  United  Provinces,  though 
at  a  considerable  distance  from  these  armies,  would  yet  have  been 
sufficiently  defended  by  the  flying  camp,  which  Henry  would  have 
caused  to  advance  towards  them,  by  the  arms  of  England  and 
the  North,  to  whose  protection  they  would  be  entrusted,  by  the 
care  which  at  first  would  have  been  taken  to  get  possession  of 
Charlemont,  Maestricht,  Namur,  and  other  places  near  the 
Meuse,  and  finally,  by  the  naval  forces  of  these  provinces,  which, 
in  conjunction  with  those  of  England,  would  have  reigned  absolute 
masters  at  sea. 

These  measures  being  taken,  the  war  could  have  fallen  only  in 
Italy  or  German}7  and  supposing  it  to  have  happened  in  the 
former,  the  three  armies  of  Henry,  the  prince  of  Orange,  and  the 
princes  of  Germany,  quitting  Franche-Comte,  after  having  for- 
tified it  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Low  Countries  by  a  small 
body  of  troops,  would  have  marched  with  their  forces  towards  the 
Alps,  where  they  would  have  been  joined  by  those  of  Lesdiguieres, 


the  pope,  the  Venetians,  and  the  duke  of  Savoy.  These  latter 
would  then  have  declared  themselves  openly ;  the  duke  of  Savoy, 
by  requiring  a  portion  for  his  duchess,  equal  to  what  had  been 
given  to  the  infanta  Isabella  and  the  other  powers,  by  demanding 
the  execution  of  the  agreement  in  regard  to  Navarre,  Naples,  and 
Sicily.  Thus,  from  all  parts  of  Europe,  war  would  be 
declared  against  Spain.  If  the  enemy  should  appear  inclined  to 
draw  the  war  into  Germany,  then  the  confederates,  having  left  a 
considerable  number  of  troops  in  Italy,  would  have  penetrated 
even  into  the  heart  of  Germany,  where,  from  Hungary  and 
Bohemia,  they  would  have  been  strengthened  by  those  powerful 
succours  which  were  there  preparing. 

The  other  events,  in  consequence  of  these  dispositions,  can  only 
be  conjectured,  because  they  would  greatly  depend  on  the  degree 
of  alacrity  with  which  the  enemy  should  oppose  the  rapidity  of 
our  conquests  and  on  the  readiness  with  which  the  confederates, 
especially  those  at  the  extremity  of  Germany,  should  make  good 
their  engagements.  Nevertheless,  I  am  persuaded  that,  from  the 
dispositions  as  here  laid  down,  there  are  none  but  must  regard 
the  house  of  Austria  as  penetrated  by  the  blow  whose  force  was 
for  ever  to  annihilate  its  power  and  open  a  passage  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  other  projected  designs,  to  which  tins  attack  could 
only  be  considered  as  the  preliminary.  I  will  add  too  (and  here 
the  voice  of  all  Europe  will  vindicate  me  from  the  imputation  of 
partiality)  that  if  the  force  necessary  to  render  such  an  enterprise 
successful  does  always  depend  on  the  person  of  the  chief  who 
conducts  it,  this  could  not  have  been  better  conferred  than  upon 
Henry  the  Great.  With  a  valour  alone  capable  of  surmounting 
the  greatest  difficulties  and  a  presence  of  mind  which  neither 
neglected  nor  lost  any  opportunities ;  with  a  prudence  which, 
without  precipitating  any  thing,  or  attempting  too  many  things 
at  a  time,  could  regularly  connect  them  together  and  perfectly 
knew  what  might  and  what  might  not  be  the  result  of  time ;  with 
a  consummate  experience ;  and  finally,  with  all  those  other  great 
qualifications,  whether  as  a  warrior  or  politician,  which  were  so 
remarkable  in  this  prince;  what  is  there  which  might  not  have 
been  obtained?  This  was  the  meaning  of  that  modest  device 
which  this  great  king  caused  to  be  inscribed  on  some  of  the  last 
medals  that  were  struck  under  his  reign,  Nil  sine  consilio. 


Vol.1.     1915.     Out  of  print. 

Vol.  2.     1915.     6S.  net. 

Treatment  of  Enemy  Aliens. 

The  Appam. 

Principles  Underlying  Doctrine  of  Contraband  and  Blockade. 

War  Crimes :  Their  Prevention  and  Punishment. 

Nationality  and  Domicil  of  Trading  Corporations. 

Neutrals  and  Belligerents  in  Territorial  Waters. 

De  la  Belligerence  dans  ses  Rapports  avec  la  Violation  de  la 


Effect  of  the  War  on  International  Law. 
International  Leagues. 
Enforcement  of  Hague  Conventions. 
Treatment  of  Civilians  in  Occupied  Territories. 
War  Treason. 
Destruction  of  Merchantmen  by  Belligerent, 

Vol.  3.     1917.     5s.  net. 
Treaties  of  Peace. 

Belligerent  Merchantmen  in  Neutral  Ports. 
The  Black  List. 
The  Deutschland. 
International  Law  Teaching. 
Control  of  Air  Spaces. 
Legal  War  Work  in  Egypt. 
Revolution  and  Unity  of  Russia. 
Relations  of  Prize  Court  to  Belligerent  Policy. 
Jus  Soli  or  Jus  Sanguinis. 
Reciprocity  in  Enjoyment  of  Civil  Rights. 

Vol.  4.     1918.     1OS.  net. 

Sequestration  of  Merchantmen. 

Highways  of  the  Sea. 

American  Conception  of  Freedom  of  the  Sea. 

Construction  of  Definition  of  "  British  Subject "  in  Nationality 

Act,  1914,  s.  1. 
Future  Law  of  Neutrality. 
Nation  in  Arms. 

Barbary  States  in  Law  of  Nations. 
Reports  of  Committees  on  Legal   Status  of  Submarines,  and 

Nationality  and  Registration. 

Continued  on   page   4    of  cover. 




TO—  ^      202  Main  Library                    8158 








L O        '  "-r.iCC:.       -•'    '   '•'  -  '     ';  ••  J-MOMiHj,  AND  i-^EAR. 


RENEWALS:  CALL  (415)  t>42-a405 


DEC  17  »98b 



DEC  U  1  19ftc' 


FORM  NO.  DD6,  60m,  1  /Q3          BERKELEY,  CA  94720 

(6889slO)4?76B                                               ^Berkeley 

Printed  ai  Kindling,  England .  hy  flic 

^YLORD  BROS.  Inc. 
Syrocu*«,  N.Y. 
Stockton,  Colif. 

YC  74022